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Abstract
Client honeypots are devices for detecting malicious servers on a network.
They interact with potentially malicious servers and analyse the Web pages
returned to assess whether these pages contain an attack. This type of at-
tack is termed a ‘drive-by-download’. Low-interaction client honeypots op-
erate a signature-based approach to detecting known malicious code. High-
interaction client honeypots run client applications in full operating systems
that are usually hosted by a virtual machine. The operating systems are
either internally or externally monitored for anomalous behaviour.
In recent years there have been a growing number of client honeypot
systems being developed, but there is little interoperability between systems
because each has its own custom operational scripts and data formats. By
creating interoperability through standard interfaces we could more easily
share usage of client honeypots and the data collected. Another problem is
providing a simple means of managing an installation of client honeypots.
Workflows are a popular technology for allowing end-users to co-ordinate e-
science experiments, so these workflow systems can potentially be utilised for
client honeypot management.
To formulate requirements for management we ran moderate-scale scans
of the .nz domain over several months using a manual script-based approach.
The main requirements were a system that is user-oriented, loosely-coupled,
and integrated with Grid computing—allowing for resource sharing across
organisations.
Our system design uses Grid services (extensions to Web services) to
wrap client honeypots, a manager component acts as a broker for user ac-
cess, and workflows orchestrate the Grid services. Our prototype wraps our
case study—Capture-HPC—with these services, using the Taverna workflow
system, and a Web portal for user access.
When evaluating our experiences we found that while our system de-
sign met our requirements, currently a Java-based application operating on
our Web services provides some advantages over our Taverna approach—
particularly for modifying workflows, maintainability, and dealing with fail-
ure. The Taverna workflows, however, are better suited for the data analysis
phase and have some usability advantages. Workflow languages such as Tav-
erna are still relatively immature, so improvements are likely to be made.
Both of these approaches are significantly easier to manage and deploy than
the previous manual script-based method.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Client honeypots are measurement devices for detecting malicious servers on
a network. They interact with potentially malicious servers and analyse the
Web pages returned to assess whether it contains an attack. This type of
attack is termed a ‘drive-by-download’. This has advantages over traditional
defences, such as firewalls and antivirus software, are ineffective against these
new threats [37] because the attack vectors delivered by the server maybe
unknown to the firewalls or the antivirus software. Locating malicious servers
and malware is a priority for helping protect consumers using the Web and
for collecting malicious code for analysis by security researchers.
There are two types of client honeypot systems: low-interaction and high-
interaction. Low-interaction client honeypots [37] operate a signature-based
approach to detecting known malicious code. High-interaction client honey-
pots run client applications (such as Web browsers) in full operating systems
that are usually hosted by virtual machines (VMs). These are either inter-
nally or externally monitored for suspicious state changes. Should malicious
content be found, the state of the host operating system is now suspect so it
must be reset to a clean state before it can interact with another server [38].
The client honeypot is an emerging research area. In recent years there
have been a growing number of client honeypot systems being developed
[44, 30, 35, 37, 45]. Between systems there is little interoperability, with
1
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each system having its own custom operational scripts and data formats.
This means that there is a lack of code reuse for common tasks and users
require detailed knowledge of these systems before they can use them.
Through the use of standardised Web service interfaces interoperability
can be increased and implementation details abstracted, meaning that the
usage of client honeypots and the data collected can be shared more easily.
This can be expanded further with the use of Grid computing [15, 16], allow-
ing secure co-ordination of heterogeneous resources located across multiple
enterprises. This type of collaboration could potentially allow the collection
and analysis of data on a scale that is many times what is currently possible.
Workflow systems can be used to orchestrate these Web services, creat-
ing processes out of a number of individual tasks. These can be graphically
modelled allowing users with little programming knowledge to manipulate
complex workflows. For example, a user could create a workflow that com-
bined the speed of a low-interaction client honeypot with the accuracy of a
high-interaction client honeypot; this could then be run in a workflow engine
and shared with other researchers.
1.1 Research Questions
• How can we effectively create systems of different client honeypots to
perform measurements and analysis?
• What is the best method to automate the various tasks that encompass
client honeypot management?
1.2 Methodology
The main tasks that make up this research are:
• Gain experience by manually managing a client honeypot for moderate
scale scans.
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• Design a Grid-based architecture for managing client honeypots.
• Evaluate workflow systems for this type of activity.
• Create realistic client honeypot operational use cases and implement
these as workflows.
• Implement a Web portal for browser based access to a client honeypot.
• Modify a client honeypot to use our architecture.
• Build a Java application for a comparative evaluation of our workflow
system.
1.3 Research Contributions
The main contributions of this research are:
1. Creation of use cases to model system requirements of a client honeypot
automation system, based on our experience of manually managing a
system for moderate-scale scans over a period of several months.
2. Creation of Grid services for wrapping client honeypots. These can be
used by workflow languages and standalone applications.
3. Implementation of workflows that use our services to model and control
complex processes used in client honeypot operation.
4. Evaluation of Introduce and gRAVI—two recently developed Grid ser-
vice authoring tools.
5. Evaluation of the Taverna workflow system for modelling and enacting
client honeypot workflows, based on our experiences.
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1.4 Overview of Chapters
Background and Related Work provides background information on rel-
evant technologies: client honeypots, Grid computing and workflow
systems; and presents related work in the area of instrument middle-
ware.
Formulation of Requirements is focused on gathering requirements for
an automated client honeypot system. From our experience of manually
operating the Capture-HPC client honeypot for moderate-scale scans
we created use cases and system requirements.
Design and Implementation describes how we designed a system to fulfil
the main requirements, and implemented a prototype of this design us-
ing WSRF services, Taverna workflows and a Web portal. This chapter
includes an evaluation of BPEL and Taverna, determining their suit-
ability for our needs.
Evaluation covers the fulfilment of requirements, comparisons to other sys-
tem designs (script-based and Java with Web services), general work-
flow usage in our domain, and an evaluation of service authoring tools.
While our system design met the requirements, currently a Java-based
application operating on our Web services provides some advantages
over our Taverna approach. The Taverna workflows, however, are bet-
ter suited for the data analysis phase.
Conclusion gives a summary of the thesis, answers to our research ques-
tions, a listing of our contributions, and directions for future work.
Appendices provide a sample Capture-HPC log file for a malicious site, a
listing of shell scripts used during manual operation, the Web service
interfaces, and source code for the Java & Web services alternative
system design.
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As part of this research we wrote two papers: [41] and [42]. The Formu-
lation of Requirements and the Design and Implementation chapters expand
upon the material covered in these papers.
Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
Section 2.1 gives background information on Client honeypots and describes
the architecture of Capture-HPC, our case study client honeypot. Section
2.2 introduces Grid computing—specifically the service-oriented architecture,
WSRF (Web Service Resource Framework), and other technologies and tools.
Section 2.3 describes related work in the area of instrument middleware—
CIMA and GRIDCC. Section 2.4 describes workflow systems, specifically
BPEL (Business Process Execution Language) and Taverna. Section 2.5
introduces the Grid Enabled Internet Instruments (GEII) research project
which we foresee our research being a part of. Finally, Section 2.6 provides
a review of all the material.
2.1 Client Honeypots
Honeypots are dedicated networked security devices that are designed to
lure malicious activity onto themselves, capturing all data associated with
an attack. The device itself has no added value to a system, so any network
traffic or new activity can be fully attributed to a security compromise—
thus eliminating the issue of false positives found in other intrusion detection
systems.
One of the major types of attack on the Internet is the client-side attack
6
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which targets a client application. Instead of a client attacking a server, the
server delivers the attack to the client as part of the server’s response to
a client request. Common examples of these attacks are Web servers that
attack Web browsers. When the Web browser requests content from a web
server, the server returns a malicious page that attacks the browser. This
could lead to arbitrary code being executed on the client machine—this type
of attack is termed a ‘drive-by-download’.
An example of such an attack would be a user with Internet Explorer
6 simply browsing to http://wwww.blackmores.co.nz/1. Unknown to the
user, when the HTML content was downloaded and interpreted, a vulnerabil-
ity in IE 6 was exploited (ie. a buffer overflow in some JavaScript code) and a
piece of malicious code was executed outside the browser’s security sandbox.
This code downloads an executable to C:\msntstza.exe and launches this
new process. This malicious process may be adware, spyware, or a botnet
drone. The website owner may also be unaware that their site is serving
drive-by-downloads if their site was compromised by a third party, eg. an
attacker compromising the hosting company’s Web servers.
Traditional defenses—such as firewalls and antivirus software—are inef-
fective against these new threats because the attack vectors delivered by the
server maybe unknown to the firewalls or the antivirus software [38].
Client honeypots can be used to identify malicious servers on a network.
They do so by generating a queue of server requests, issuing these requests
to the servers one-by-one and consuming the response of the servers. After
a response is consumed, the client honeypot can perform an analysis that
determines whether the server is malicious or benign. Figure 2.1 shows the
architecture of a generic client honeypot.
A low-interaction client honeypot will analyse the server’s response and
match the signature to a list of known attacks. If there is a match, the server
will be classified as malicious. Honeyd Virtual Honeypot [30] is an example
of a low-interaction client honeypot.
1This was an actual attack we captured, the log files are included in Appendix A
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Client Honeypot
Request
Response
Request
Attack
Malicious
Server
Benign
Server
Figure 2.1: Client honeypot architecture [38].
A high-interaction client honeypot uses a more thorough approach. Full
client operating systems and applications are used and the entire system is
monitored for state changes. Classification is based on monitoring unautho-
rised state changes or actions occurring on the system after the client hon-
eypot has interacted with a server. Client honeypots are dedicated machines
and since no other activity is occurring on them, unauthorised state changes
such as new processes, newly installed files, etc. can be detected by the client
honeypot. Once state changes are detected and the classification has been
made, the machine needs to be reset into a clean state before it can interact
with another server [38]. The advantage of this approach is it can detect
both known and unknown attacks, however the increased resources needed
means this method is slower than a low-interaction client honeypot. Strider
HoneyMonkey [45] is an example of a high-interaction client honeypot.
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2.1.1 Capture Honeypot Client
Capture-HPC [35] is a high-interaction client honeypot being developed by
Seifert et al. We have chosen Capture-HPC as a case study for this research.
Figure 2.2 shows the architecture of Capture which runs on a group of net-
worked computers. A set of URLs to be tested is passed to the Capture-server
component, which (one-by-one) delegates these to Capture-client components
to test. The CaptureClient instance is executed inside a Virtual Machine
(VM) hosting Windows XP (a default installation and standard network se-
curity settings). Multiple VMs, each running a CaptureClient instance, can
be concurrently run inside the same VM environment on one physical ma-
chine. When the CaptureClient receives the URL from the server it invokes
Internet Explorer to visit the Web server and waits a set time (currently set
at 10 seconds). The CaptureClient continuously records any state changes—
by monitoring the registry, processes and file system—and sends this to the
server for analysis (exclusion lists are used to identify benign system activ-
ity). CaptureServer then makes a decision on whether the Web server is
malicious, in which case the server records the data and resets the VM to a
clean snapshot ready for the next URL to test [36].
CaptureServer controls the CaptureClients by using the VMWare VIX
API. The API interfaces with the VMWare Tools component which is in-
stalled in the Windows XP VM. This allows for control of the VM, both
internally and externally, such as launching applications and powering on
the VM respectively. During operation CaptureServer initially uses VIX to
revert the VM to its saved snapshot and launches the CaptureClient.exe
application (supplying its own IP address). The CaptureClient then creates
a TCP connection to the server and waits for URLs to be passed to it. When
it receives URLs it loads the browser to visit the page, reporting any state
changes back over the TCP connection. If the state changes indicate the
URL is malicious, CaptureServer resets the VM via VIX and the process
begins again.
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Capture Server
Capture Client
VMware
VM1 - WinXP
Client IE
VM2 - WinXP
Client IE
...
Web Server 1
Request
ResponseURLs
Web Server 2
Management 
info
Output- Web 
server lists, etc
...
Figure 2.2: Capture-HPC architecture.
2.1.2 Data Capture and Analysis
To analyse a drive-by-download attack it is necessary to gather the data
delivered from the Web server to the client. This cannot be done by simply
saving the HTML of the Web page as this does not include any external
JavaScript, iFrames, etc. This content will not necessarily be able to be
retrieved at a later date because with the dynamic nature of the Web, content
may change and sites can go down. A solution to this problem is to capture
all of the network data using the pcap (packet capture) API. Capture-HPC
uses the WinPcap utility to dump all network packets into a file for later
analysis.
However, research has shown custom tools have to be developed to access
and examine the dumped pcap data—decoding the network protocols—and
once the information is extracted from the network data it does not allow
behavioral analysis of the attack, limiting the ability to determine what hap-
pened on the attacked system [34]. The solution is to use HTTP and DNS
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caches to persistently store all traffic, creating a simple record/replay mech-
anism for data collection and behavioural analysis [34]. The Squid HTTP
cache [47] and pdnsd DNS proxy [25] are suitable for this purpose—with only
simple modifications to their configuration files required to prevent flushing
and always force caching—thus allowing permanent data storage.
Using the data captured from tested URLs (log files and caches), data
analysis techniques can be used to gather a better insight into malicious Web
servers and the attacks they deliver. Analysis can be made of a specific URL
to determine the geographic locations of the Web server and exploit server
(using geo-IP services), characteristics of the HTML page, and the nature
of the attack. By examining large sets of sample URLs the aforementioned
URL-specific analysis can be used to draw inferences upon the experimental
population. These samples, when taken over a period of time, allow trends
to be analysed and possibly predictions to be made.
2.2 Grid Computing
Grid computing [16, 15] is an area of distributed computing, with the goal
being “co-ordinated resource sharing and problem solving in dynamic, multi-
institutional virtual organisations” [16]. The sharing that the Grid is con-
cerned with is not the traditional file access and transfer, but rather access
to computers, software, data, and other resources. This sharing is highly
controlled with access determined by rules related to membership of virtual
organisations (VOs). These VOs are formed from the heterogeneous resources
within a single enterprise or multiple enterprises (eg. collaborating universi-
ties) and any external resource sharing or service provider relationships.
To help define what a Grid is, Foster provides a checklist [13] of require-
ments for a Grid system:
• Coordinate resources that are not subject to centralised control—a Grid
integrates resources and users from different domains and addresses
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issues of security, policy, payments, etc. that cannot be centrally man-
aged.
• Using standard, open, general-purpose protocols and interfaces—functionality
such authentication, authorisation, resource discovery, and resource ac-
cess all use multi-purpose protocols and interfaces.
• Deliver nontrivial qualities of service—a Grid allows its resources to be
used in a coordinated fashion to deliver various qualities of service to
meet complex user demands.
Client honeypots can currently be distributed but could potentially be en-
hanced further with Grid computing. Heterogeneous hardware located across
multiple enterprises could be coordinated to provide client honeypots with
data capture and analysis abilities. The Grid would also allow this data to
be shared within a VO, which may include a number of universities from
different countries. This type of collaboration could allow the collection and
analysis of data on a scale that is many times what is currently possible.
With this huge processing potential, almost real-time analysis may be fea-
sible. In Section 2.2.3 we describe some of the specific Grid technologies
that are applicable to client honeypots—including file transfer, storage and
security.
2.2.1 Service Oriented Architecture
Service-oriented architecture (SOA) is widely used in the business sector for
building large-scale information systems [8]. SOA defines standardised inter-
faces and protocols for exchanging data between services without requiring
knowledge of the internal implementation. This level of abstraction and in-
teroperability allows for complex applications to operate over multiple loosely
coupled systems using common services. The same principles that make SOA
desirable in the business domain are also applicable to scientific areas. Grid
computing is using a SOA approach for defining core services and providing
access to Grid resources [15].
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 13
Web services use XML messages that follow the Simple Object Access
Protocol (SOAP) standard [48]. A service usually has an attached Web Ser-
vice Description Language (WSDL) specification which defines a collection
of network endpoints—or ports—for the service. Any custom data types
are also specified in the WSDL as XML schemas. The SOAP and WSDL
specifications are developed by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C).
These fine-grained Web services can be coupled together to create com-
plex processes using workflows. We will discuss workflow systems further in
Section 2.4.
2.2.2 WSRF Services
Standard Web services provide a stateless API to users. This is suitable for
many application domains but when operating with physical (and virtual)
resources there is a need to store state information. For example, in our
client honeypot domain access to VMs would need to be controlled—only
one client honeypot can use a VM at once—so state information on VMs is
required. Web Service Resource Framework (WSRF) is an extension of Web
services that allows the service to store this state information. This is stored
in resource variables forming part of the service.
WSRF services match resources to users by generating a unique endpoint
reference for each new resource and providing this to users. Subsequent calls
to methods that use this resource will include the endpoint reference in an
extended SOAP header. WSRF services are defined with a WSDL in the
same way as standard Web services are.
2.2.3 Useful Grid Technologies
Here we describe some of the Grid technologies that may be useful to client
honeypots:
• Grid middleware—is a collection of components enabling the under-
lying technology that forms a Grid. The components include software
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services and libraries for resource monitoring, discovery, and manage-
ment, plus security and file management. Open Grid Services Archi-
tecture (OGSA) is developed by the Global Grid Forum (GGF) and
describes an architecture for service-oriented Grid computing environ-
ments. GT4 (Globus Toolkit 4) [14], gLite [23] and UNICORE [11] are
examples of Grid middleware systems.
• Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI)—these tools are used for au-
thentication (of users and services), secure communications, and autho-
risation on the Grid. They are also used for management functions such
as overseeing user credentials and group membership information. GSI
allows security across organisational boundaries and is therefore not
a centrally-managed system. It is a “single sign-on” system for users
of the Grid, so handles any delegation of credentials for computations
that involve multiple resources. [46]
• GridFTP—this is an extension to the standard File Transfer Protocol
(FTP) and is defined as part of the Globus Toolkit. The aim is to
provide a standard interface for reliable high-performance file transfer
over Grid systems. This is a necessity for many Grid applications that
need to transfer very large files reliably and securely. The main features
are: parallel data transfer, third-party controlled data transfer, GSI
security, and fault-recovery. [2]
• Grid Resource Allocation Manager (GRAM)—is a standard pro-
tocol for communicating with the various job schedulers available, such
as Condor, LSF (Load Sharing Facility), and PBS (Portable Batch Sys-
tem). GRAM address security, reliability, and performance concerns,
client and server management of resources, and the ability to transfer
data to and from remote resources. [12]
• Storage Resource Broker (SRB)—is a middleware system provid-
ing uniform access to heterogeneous large-scale data storage over the
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Grid. Features include logical address spaces, searchable metadata,
access control, and collections. SRBs work on top of existing storage
systems, real-time data sources, and relational database management
systems. Users have access to features such as collaborative sharing,
version control, replication, and preservation of distributed data collec-
tions. [31]
2.2.4 Grid Service Authoring Tools
Introduce [19] is an open-source toolkit for authoring WSRF compliant Grid
services—it aims to reduce the development and deployment effort by ab-
stracting the low-level implementation detail of the Globus Toolkit. Intro-
duce supports the creation of strongly-typed services, where input and output
data types to a service are defined and published.
Using a Java based GUI, users define their services and their method
signatures with built-in or custom data types. Introduce then generates the
low-level service code, leaving method stubs for the user to fill in with code
to implement the service functionality. A client application is also generated
to test the services. Introduce can then deploy the WSRF services to an
application container—GT4, JBoss or Apache Tomcat.
gRAVI (Grid Rapid Application Virtualization Interface) [7] is a plugin
for Introduce that helps developers wrap legacy command-line applications
with WSRF compliant Grid services. The aim is to require no user code and
limited technical knowledge, with the bridging code for the Introduce meth-
ods automatically generated. gRAVI can also create a basic Web application
to access the service through a Web browser.
2.3 Existing Instrument Middleware
To bring client honeypots to the Grid, we must look at existing work in this
field. While there is no other research in this specific area, a client honeypot
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can be treated as a measurement instrument, so we can look at Grid instru-
mentation projects. There are several of these which have been developed
in the last few years on which to base the integration of instruments with
Grid computing. The two most important are the Common Instrument Mid-
dleware Architecture (CIMA) [9, 6] and the Grid Enabled Remote Instru-
mentation with Distributed Control and Computation (GRIDCC) project
[24, 17].
2.3.1 CIMA
CIMA provides a framework which has developed implementations from low
power wireless sensors through to collaboration and control of large physi-
cal sciences instruments. Figure 2.3 shows the CIMA architecture. CIMA
allows scientists to access, store and transport data and remotely control
scientific instruments and sensor in Grids. The emerging CIMA framework
provides the basis to encapsulate client honeypots and develop wide scale
Internet measurement systems. CIMA includes integration with GridSphere
portals and SRBs. However, the architecture may require extensions in secu-
rity/privacy, metadata for Internet measurements, enhanced business process
execution and data normalisation services.
2.3.2 GRIDCC
GRIDCC provides a similar solution, based on EGEE/gLite middleware [23].
Figure 2.4 shows the GRIDCC architecture. The main components are
the Virtual Control Room (VCR) and the Virtual Instrument Grid Service
(VIGS). Scientific workflows are executed through the Execution Services
(ES) using the Workflow Management Systems (WfMS) to manage Instru-
ment Elements (IE), Compute Elements (CE) and Storage Elements (SE).
GRIDCC has developed a number of instruments based on the EGEE
(Enabling Grids for E-sciencE) Grid implementation. The GRIDCC project
has implementations that encompass instrumentation on the electrical power
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Figure 2.3: The CIMA extended architecture [5].
Figure 2.4: GRIDCC architecture [24].
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 18
grid, geo-hazard monitoring, meteorology, medical instruments and telecom-
munications. The GRIDCC project aims to put their Instrument Element
middleware into a FPGA (Field-programmable Gate Array) for integration
in smaller sensors.
2.4 Workflow Systems
Many business systems use workflows to manage their business processes.
Workflows are constructed by connecting multiple tasks according to their
dependencies and temporal relationships, which can be represented as either
a directed acyclic graph (DAG), or a non-DAG which allows loops in the
connections between elements. A DAG-based workflow provides sequence,
parallelism, and choice structures. In addition a non-DAG workflows can also
include the iteration structure. These four types of workflow structure can
be used to construct complex workflows, and sub-workflows can be combined
to form a large-scale workflow [49].
Workflows can be represented in a number of ways: by hand (such as
documenting a flow chart), writing programs in languages such as Java, or
using a workflow language that executes the workflow in a workflow engine.
Workflow languages have a number of benefits: a structured representation
designed specifically for this purpose, lack of required technical knowledge,
and a graphical representation of workflows.
In the recent past, there have been a large number of workflow languages/
systems developed for defining, managing and executing workflows. One
recent survey found over 30 scientific workflow systems [39]. It is probable
we will soon see consolidation and standardisation as the research area of
workflows matures.
Workflow languages for business and scientific domains tend to have dif-
fering focuses. Business workflow languages are usually services-oriented
with strong support for iteration and control of tasks; this can be consid-
ered control-oriented. Scientific workflow languages typically have strong
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support for pipelining data—modifying some data and passing it on to the
next task—and are often DAG-based, these can be considered data-oriented.
In Section 2.3 we introduced two Grid instrument middleware frame-
works, CIMA and GRIDCC. Of these two, GRIDCC has provided an open-
source implementation for experimentation. The CIMA project uses Kepler
workflows [3], a DAG scientific workflow system based on the Ptolemy II sys-
tem for heterogeneous, concurrent modeling and design. GRIDCC uses the
Business Process Execution Language (BPEL) with extensions developed for
QoS (Quality of Service) and SLA (Service Level Agreements).
2.4.1 BPEL
BPEL is widely considered the de-facto standard for Web service orches-
tration, particularly in the business sector, and is more mature than many
alternatives. It is a convergence of two languages, WSFL (Web Services
Flow Language) and XLANG, developed by IBM and Microsoft respectively.
The current version, WS-BPEL version 2.0 [27] was approved by OASIS, the
international standards consortium, in April 2007. BPEL is a non-DAG, ex-
tensible XML-based language. The specification does not define a graphical
notation for visual representation of workflows, so this is left up to individual
vendors although flowchart conventions are often used.
Although originally developed for business processes, BPEL has also been
suggested for scientific workflows due to its expressibility, standardisation,
and maturity of tools [1]. However, BPEL does have some drawbacks for
this domain, such as a lack of integration with the Web Service Resource
Framework (WSRF) [10].
Grid Integration
A limitation of BPEL is its lack of integration with the Grid. Specifically
it does not support WSRF services, large file transfer mechanisms (such as
GridFTP) or the GSI security model. However, we have identified extensions
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to BPEL that aim to integrate this missing Grid functionality.
Dornemann et al [10] have created extensions to BPEL to allow it operate
on WSRF (Web Service Resource Framework) resources by introducing a new
activity called gridInvoke (GI) which is derived from the invoke activity
and transparently handles the invocation of state-aware WSRF services. GI
allows Web services to store the state of operations and properties while
still being compatible to standard Web services. Utilising this framework
for workflows would prevent a number of possible error situations and assist
with integration into the Grid environment.
Amnuaykanjanasin and Nupairoj [4] propose an architecture to enable
Grid composition based on OGSI (Open Grid Services Infrastructure) and
BPEL. Their approach uses proxy services enabling users to interact with
OGSI Grid services, in particular supporting GSI security, factory and no-
tification mechanisms. These proxy services are orchestrated in workflows
using standard BPEL and allow run-time bindings. While the approach
of using automatically generated proxy services for every Grid service adds
complexity, the ability to use Grid security mechanisms, which implies cross-
organisational security, is highly beneficial.
A solution to the implementation of large file transfers, is to use Slomiski’s
proposal of pseudo partners [40] to encapsulate Grid file transfer services.
Partners in BPEL are services that a workflow needs and are typically mapped
to Web (or Grid) services. However, it is also possible to map BPEL partners
to locally implemented services with appropriate WSDL port types provided.
Services without a network endpoint are termed pseudo partners as they are
not accessible as ‘real’ Web services but still implement WSDL port types.
Tools such as the Web Services Invocation Framework (WSIF) can be used
to implement pseudo partners’ local services, for example a method in a Java
class. Pseudo partners can provide services such as support for large data
files transfers using GridFTP, component management XCAT, or interacting
with Condor [40].
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2.4.2 Taverna
Taverna [28] is an open-source data-oriented scientific workflow system de-
veloped as part of the myGrid project. It consists of both a client-side Java
GUI application for workflow design and an execution engine for enacting
workflows. Like BPEL, Taverna supports the creation of complex workflows
containing Web Services and sub-workflows. Individual methods from a Web
service are called processors and are connected by data links or explicit con-
trol links if data does not flow between processors. Taverna workflows are
described using a proprietary language called Scufl (Simple Conceptual Uni-
fied Flow language), which is an XML-based language similar to BPEL—but
unlike BPEL, Scufl is a data-oriented language in which each processor is
passed input data and produces output data for subsequent processors. Data
flows are sent in XML form and complex inputs and outputs can be created
using a special Taverna processor called an XML splitter that combines or
breaks down data streams.
Unlike most data-flow languages, Taverna is a non-DAG system. Itera-
tion, however, is not explicit so does not have the same control has a lan-
guage like BPEL. Even with just implicit iteration Taverna is still a Turing-
compliant language [18]. Implicit iteration is used when a processor is given
more inputs than it expects—such as passing a list of elements into a pro-
cessor that consumes a single element—each input is processed individually
until the list has been iterated through and any outputs from the processor
are combined into a list once all input items have been processed.
Another kind of Taverna processor is the Java BeanShell. These are pieces
of Java code that are interpreted during workflow execution. This allows
powerful extensibility to workflows but requires programming knowledge.
BeanShells are typically used to transform the output of one processor before
it is input into the following processor. Taverna also includes some built-
in local processors (which act like BeanShells, with predefined inputs and
outputs) for simple tasks such as encoding a byte array into Base64.
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2.5 Grid Enabled Internet Instruments
A client honeypot is a type of Internet instrumentation, that is, it takes a
measurement of an aspect of the Internet—the number of malicious servers
in a sample of URLs. Another type of Internet instrument is the network
telescope [26]. These are passive monitoring devices using unused IP address
space on a network that capture any packet sent to that address space. The
traffic received by network telescopes is called Internet Background Radia-
tion (IBR) [29]. This traffic may be caused by viruses, worms, malicious
hackers scanning for vulnerabilities, misconfiguration etc.—because there is
no legitimate reason to send traffic to this address space. Successfully detect-
ing and eliminating IBR traffic is important for both reducing the amount
of non-productive traffic and also affording a general increase in security.
The goal of the Grid Enabled Internet Instruments (GEII) research project
[22] is to develop a framework for using Grid technology combined with
emerging Internet instrumentation to provide large scale Internet measure-
ment mechanisms, thus enable new quality measures by which we could de-
termine the state of the Internet. Such measures might include a ‘Safety
Index’ or ‘Compromise Index’ which indicates the potential for a vulnerable
computer to be compromised, a “Malicious Web Server Index” being the per-
centage or attack capacity of malicious web servers on the Internet. These
instruments can capture large amounts of data requiring time consuming
analysis so using Grid technologies such as GridFTP, SRBs, and data pro-
cessing resources would be beneficial. Different components may be spread
across organisations to create a Grid of sensors with federated data collection
and analysis.
Figure 2.5 shows the proposed architecture of the GEII framework [22].
This shows a number of example instruments (with wrapper envelopes), the
central Federated Data Manager, and the Grid services offering processing,
storage, security and user interfaces. The example instruments are a VoIP
Quality Monitor [21], an IBR Network Telescope [29], and two client honey-
pots: Capture-HPC (our case study), and HoneyMonkey [45].
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Figure 2.5: High-level view of the GEII architecture [22].
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We foresee our research into client honeypot automation being one part of
the larger GEII project, with our solutions being extendible to other Internet
instruments.
2.6 Review
We now provide a brief review—to tie it all together—of the background and
related work covered in this chapter.
We described how client honeypots are used to detect malicious Web
servers serving ‘drive-by-downloads’—both in their high and low-interaction
variations (our case-study Capture-HPC is an example of the former). Grid
computing—with its resource sharing across organisations—is a potentially
valuable technology for enhancing client honeypot systems. Likewise, work-
flow languages—orchestrating tasks made up of Web services into complex
processes—is another potentially useful technology, with BPEL and Taverna
being two suitable languages. Client honeypots are one example of an In-
ternet instrument and we foresee our research being applicable to the wider
GEII research project.
We described two instrument middleware projects, CIMA and GRIDCC,
which have a similar goal of bringing instruments to the Grid, though the
their domain is physical instrumentation. Our focus in this research is to
explore workflows so not it is not necessary to use a complete instrument
middleware, but future integration is an option.
Chapter 3
Formulation of Requirements
In order to assess the requirements of an automated system we gained nec-
essary experience by manually operating Capture-HPC for moderate scale
scans over a period of seven months. This was part of a study of the .nz
domain, and from this experience we discovered the deficiencies of such a
manual approach.
In this chapter we begin by giving an overview of the study and the ar-
chitecture we used, in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 respectively. Section 3.3 describes
the procedure we used including installation, configuration, testing, opera-
tion and termination. Section 3.4 looks at the data analysis, presenting some
results from the study. In Section 3.5 we formulate general requirements for
Grid-based automation, and by creating uses cases, in Section 3.6, more spe-
cific requirements . Finally, in Section 3.7 we specify the main requirements
to focus on, and define the scope of our research.
3.1 Overview of Study
The study, commissioned by InternetNZ, gathered intelligence on the threat
from malicious servers across the .nz domain. The aim was to inspect a
representative set of the index pages of publicly accessible .nz Web servers
to determine if they host malicious content. This content may be placed
25
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there either deliberately or via a website defacement.
For this study we have completed seven monthly-scans where each scan
inspected approximately 250,000 hosts.
For more information on the study, including the project reports, see [20].
3.2 System Architecture
The set-up used for this study consisted of six machines—five Capture-clients
and one Capture-server—all running the Fedora Core 7 Linux distribution.
The Capture-server is a 2.13GHz Core 2 Duo (2GB memory and 160GB hard
disk), while the Capture-clients consist of three 2.4GHz Core 2 Quads (4GB
memory and 500GB hard disks) and two 2.8GHz Pentium Ds (1.5GB memory
and 80GB hard disks). Figure 3.1 shows the deployment diagram of the set-
up. The clients each have VMWare server (and additional VMWare VIX API
libraries), with up to three virtual machine instances. Each virtual machine is
an image created of Windows XP Service Pack 2 with the CaptureClient and
VMWare Tools installed inside. The server has CaptureServer, Squid Web
proxy cache, and pdnsd DNS proxy installed. Due to the risk of attacks,
security is very important for all the machines so restrictive firewalls were
configured and only remote access from static IP addresses is allowed. Key
authentication—using a 1024-bit shared key—was a final step used to prevent
unauthorised access.
Due to the dynamic nature of the Web and the possible use of IP-
tracking—whereby a malicious Web server logs IP addresses and serves be-
nign page when subsequently accessed—we stored the Web pages when we
accessed them. This meant malicious content could be later retrieved for
analysis [33]. This was implemented using Web and DNS proxies for the
clients, configured to persistently cache all data.
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Figure 3.1: Deployment diagram of our Capture-HPC setup.
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3.3 Procedure
Running our client honeypot system consisted of five steps: installation,
configuration, testing, operation and termination. In each of the following
sections we describe the step, problems encountered and improvements to be
made.
3.3.1 Installation
All the host machines in the cluster had a default Fedora Core 7 installation.
Capture-clients had VMWare Server 1.0.4 and VMWare VIX libraries in-
stalled, and a VMWare module compiled for the kernel. The Capture-server
had Java 1.6, Squid 2.6, PDNSD 1.2.6 and CaptureServer 2.0 packages in-
stalled.
For the client system a new VMWare image was created and Windows
XP SP2 was installed, then CaptureClient, VMWare tools and pcap packages
were installed. This image was archived and used for future installations.
The process of host machine installation could be simplified if a custom
Linux distribution was developed with all the requisite packages included and
if remote installation was used.
3.3.2 Configuration
Components such as the firewall, proxies, and CaptureServer needed their
configuration files edited and environment variables set. Networking was
configured for both the host systems and client systems (the server was as-
signed a new external IP address for every run to avoid IP tracking). SSH
was set up and keys were distributed. The VM image of the client system
was allocated to the Capture-clients.
The above configuration was done with a mixture of manual editing
(eg. setting up networking parameters such as the host IP address), copy-
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ing of files (eg. shell file with environment variables), and shell scripting1
(eg. distributing the VM images). Even tasks that could be scripted were
not necessarily simple, it could be an error-prone process because the scripts
were fairly unforgiving, and their interpreted and sequential nature meant
carrying out a number of steps over a list of Capture-clients could take a long
time to execute—up to half an hour.
If the process of installation was done via a custom distribution (as pro-
posed earlier), then some of this configuration could be handled at installa-
tion. Also, by giving Capture-servers more control over the set-up of Capture-
clients we would reduce the number of scripts and manual edits required.
3.3.3 Testing
Exclusion lists were used by Capture to exclude normal system activity—
running processes, registry activity, and file reads/writes. There was a sep-
arate exclusion list for each of these three types of activity. The rules are
formed by listing the operations and filepaths, with regular expression wild-
cards allowed. The following is an example of a fileMonitor.exl entry to
disregard IE accessing cookies:
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
C:\\Documents and Settings\\.+\\Cookies\\.+
Testing was required to check that no erroneous malicious activity was
reported during access to normal benign Web pages. This testing had to be
manually carried out as it requires knowledge of what normal system activity
is and the formulation of rules.
Another important task before operation was to check the optimum num-
ber of VMs per Capture-client for maximum throughput. As the number of
VMs increased, the usage of resources rose significantly. This was critical
during the VM revert operation as the large amount of disk access could
1A complete listing of the operational scripts we created is provided in Appendix B.
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cause a major bottleneck if multiple reverts were occurring, hence staggering
of reverts was necessary. Testing was required to find the “sweet spot” of
VMs per machine. Scripts were used to measure throughput (average number
of URLs per hour) and configuration files were adjusted as appropriate.
3.3.4 Operation and Termination
Immediately before a run was started the Web and DNS caches were cleared,
the list of URLs to test was copied to the Capture-server and its configuration
file edited with the parameters for the experiment, eg. visit time and details
of the VMs.
A script was then used to start CaptureServer and periodically check the
progress, restarting if necessary. Another script was run to give ongoing
statistics such as numbers of URLs visited, malicious pages, and time-outs.
At completion, the CaptureServer process was terminated and an email no-
tification could optionally be sent.
A complete run of the scan took 5–6 days with our configuration of 13
VMs. During operation this configuration remained static. If a change had
been required (such as adding or removing VMs), the CaptureServer would
need to have been stopped, configuration file edited, URL list rebuilt, and
server restarted. This would cause a drop in performance until the system
was properly up and running again. While it was sufficient to have a static
configuration for a study of our size, any larger experiment with more ma-
chines and over a longer period of time could find this inflexibility a problem;
especially because for a very large cluster the probability of at least one hard-
ware failure during the experiment would be quite high.
When undertaking progress checks it was noted that it would be bene-
ficial to be able to select from different levels of information in a progress
report. For example, sometimes we would just like to know the percentage of
URLs processed and other times we would like to know more in-depth infor-
mation such as a listing of positive URLs and throughput statistics. Also, the
progress statistics only gave overall figures, by not having more fine-grained
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data a machine running VMWare server could crash and result in reduced
overall throughput but would not be immediately obvious. Therefore a man-
agement function would be useful.
3.4 Data Analysis
When the operational run was completed all of the CaptureServer log files
were aggregated using a script. Pages that were determined to be malicious or
had crashed the browser were verified to prevent false positives. These could
occur if the exclusion lists had not triggered properly or did not include a
benign activity. This verification was done both manually and using a script
to filter common occurrences.
Using this list of verified malicious pages the caches were condensed to
include only these Web pages. Further runs were then made using a fully
patched Windows XP system operating on the cached data. Analysis was
also made of the IP addresses of Web servers—which were used to predict
their physical locations.
3.4.1 Results from Study
In this section we provide an overview of results from the study, more detailed
analysis can be found in [32]. Over the eight months of our study, a total
of 291 unique malicious URLs were identified in the .nz domain, or about
0.12% of all hosts. Figure 3.2 summarises the results of these monthly scans
(no scan was conducted in May).
An average of 73.6 malicious URLs were observed each month. There was
a high level of variation, with a standard deviation of 16.2, and fluctuations
between 52 (April 2008) and 97 (July 2008) malicious URLs. Regression
analysis using least squares determined a p-value of 0.413, meaning there is
no evidence of any trend.
Of the malicious URLs identified over the eight month period, a con-
CHAPTER 3. FORMULATION OF REQUIREMENTS 32
0
25
50
75
100
A
p
r-
0
8
M
a
y
-0
8
J
u
n
-0
8
J
u
l-
0
8
A
u
g
-0
8
S
e
p
-0
8
O
c
t-
0
8
N
o
v
-0
8
62
88
7778
97
62
51
Figure 3.2: Monthly scan results—counts of malicious servers in the .nz
domain (no scan was conducted in May).
siderable portion of the malicious URLs were newly classified as malicious
compared to the previous month. This data is shown in Table 3.1. In July
2008, for instance, nearly 80% of the malicious URLs were newly classified
as malicious compared to June 2008. Over the following four months, the
percentage of newly classified malicious URLs decreased continuously. In
November 2008, about 34% of the malicious URLs were newly classified as
malicious compared to October 2008.
All URLs were also inspected with a fully patched system. No URL suc-
cessfully attacked a system configured with fully patched versions of Windows
XP and Internet Explorer.
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Table 3.1: Summary of .nz monthly scan results.
Month Total
malicious
New ma-
licious
% new
malicious
Diff.
malicious
from prev.
month
% diff.
from
previous
month
Apr-08 51 - - - -
Jun-08 62 29 46.8 29 46.8
Jul-08 97 75 77.3 77 79.4
Aug-08 78 43 55.1 60 76.9
Sep-08 77 34 44.2 55 71.4
Oct-08 88 38 43.2 47 53.4
Nov-08 62 21 33.9 27 43.5
Average 73.6 40.0 50.1 49.2 61.9
3.5 General Requirements for Grid-based Au-
tomation
Using our experience of manually operating a client honeypot system we
have formulated the following requirements for automation using a Grid-
based architecture:
1. User-oriented—the aim being to focus on how the user wants to interact
with the instrument. From the user’s perspective they have a list of
URLs, and want them run on a particular type of client honeypot
configuration (OS, browser, visit time, etc.) and are not concerned with
the details of the actual set-up. This would require a broker service with
look-ups to a dynamic registry of client honeypots. Implementation
details, such as the configuration of Capture-clients, can be automated
by passing responsibility to the Capture-server. Users should also have
options such as the choice of different levels of detail in progress reports.
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2. Loosely-coupled—interoperability would allow various types of client
honeypots to be plugged in with the same interfaces. Instruments could
work in conjunction, for example low and high-interaction client honey-
pots could be used together for faster less-accurate and slower precise
runs respectively.
3. Grid-integrated—full incorporation of Grid technologies is important.
By using Grid services such as SRBs, GridFTP, GSI security, and
WSRF services, we can utilise the many Grid resources available, pro-
vide a flexible architecture and promote interoperability over multiple
sites.
4. Dynamic—the system should perform analysis as results are gathered,
such real-time analysis could allow for immediate response against new
attacks.
5. Fault-tolerant—to be successful on the Grid the system should not be
too rigid. It needs to be fault-tolerant so Capture-clients are monitored
and can be automatically added or removed. Ideally the whole state of
the system could be saved and migrated to another system.
For practical reasons we must limit the scope of our research and focus on
the core requirements. Therefore, we will focus on the first three—a system
that is user-oriented, loosely-coupled and Grid-integrated.
3.6 Use Cases
We have utilised use cases to help gather key requirements and help de-
fine the role the system must take in user interactions. Figure 3.3 shows a
use case diagram modelling system functionality from the user’s perspective.
The simplest non-trivial use case scenario would be a user submitting a list
of URLs to a client honeypot and simply receiving the results. In section
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3.6.1 we expand upon that scenario with a more complex experiment, and in
Section 3.6.2 we provide some variations to that specific scenario.
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Figure 3.3: Use case diagram showing the main functionality of the system
from the User actor’s perspective.
3.6.1 Example Scenario
In this specification we describe a particular path through a use case written
from the actor’s point of view, listing the steps needed to accomplish the
goal.
Use case name: Testing URLs on two differently configured systems.
Overview: The actor in this use case is a client honeypot user, eg. a
security researcher. The goal is to test whether a list of malicious URLs can
exploit vulnerabilities on two differently configured systems. Each system
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is a virtual machine and we assume images exist for each configuration. To
achieve this goal, a URL list is batch processed on the first VM, and then any
malicious URLs are feed into the second VM for further testing. An example
of this would be testing on a non-patched system and subsequently testing
on a patched system—by passing only the malicious URLs to the second VM
we significantly speed up the process.
Main scenario: Below shows the steps that make up this scenario. The
sub-use cases from Figure 3.3 are referenced in brackets.
1. User identifies a registered client honeypot system and logs in (A).
2. System authenticates the user (A).
3. User passes configuration options for first system (B).
4. User transfers a list of URLs to be tested (C, H).
5. User instructs the system to begin processing (D).
6. System invokes the client honeypot to begin processing on the first VM
(D).
7. User optionally requests the status of processing (E).
8. System outputs summary information of client honeypot progress (G).
9. When processing is finished, system informs user (C, D).
10. System transfers completed log files (G, H).
11. User aggregates the log files, extracting the malicious URLs into a new
list (outside the system).
12. User passes configuration options for second system (B).
13. User transfers their new list of aggregated malicious URLs (C, H).
14. User instructs the system to begin processing (D).
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15. System invokes the client honeypot to begin processing on the second
VM (D).
16. User optionally requests the status of processing (E).
17. System outputs summary information of client honeypot progress (G).
18. When processing is finished, system informs user (C, D).
19. System transfers completed log files (G, H).
20. User aggregates the log files, creating results lists— a list of URLs that
are malicious on both systems and another for those that are malicious
only on the first (outside the system).
Exceptions:
11a. There are zero malicious URLs—user skips processing URLs on the
second VM and goes to step 20 (creating the results lists).
3.6.2 Scenario Variations
Other client honeypot experiment use cases include:
• Combining two different client honeypot systems—in this scenario a
user passes URLs to one client honeypot system and feeds the output
into another system in the same organisation. An example would be
firstly using a low-interaction client honeypot and then feeding the
malicious pages into a high-interaction client honeypot, thus utilising
the speed of the former with the accuracy of the latter. The main
difference to the scenario specified in Section 3.6.1 is the need for the
user to identify and log into the second client honeypot.
• Combining client honeypots from multiple domains—the goal of this
use case is to test URLs on client honeypots located in different do-
mains. An example would be two universities collaborating—sharing
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their client honeypot resources. Compared to the scenario in Section
3.6.1 the security requirements will be higher as virtual organisation
security systems such as GSI would be used. Also, there may be re-
quirements to anonymise data to meet organisational requirements.
3.7 Main Requirements and Scope of Research
In this chapter we have uncovered a number of requirements for automating
client honeypot systems. For practical reasons we must limit the scope of
our research and focus on the core requirements—the goal is to implement a
prototype system which allows further functionality to be added later.
In Section 3.5 we specified the three general requirements we would focus
on a system that is user-oriented, loosely-coupled and Grid-integrated. The
detailed requirements are specified in terms of use cases, given in Section 3.6.
We define the scope of this research as follows:
• Focus on creating WSRF Grid services and the practicalities of work-
flows, such as combining multiple VM images and heterogeneous sys-
tems.
• Focus on the operation and data analysis phases of the client honey-
pot lifecycle. As already mentioned, the installation and configuration
phases could be largely automated by using a custom Linux distribu-
tion.
• Limit to a single organisation. Therefore security issues, resource man-
agement, and virtual organisations are not covered.
• Not include fault tolerance at this stage. Workflows and services will
throw generic exceptions on error conditions, but we will not focus on
fault recovery.
Chapter 4
Design and Implementation
This chapter focuses on the design and implementation of our system, cre-
ated to meet the requirements we gathered in the previous chapter. Section
4.1 describes our system architecture. Section 4.2 investigates the workflow
design including: areas of application, an evaluation of BPEL and Taverna,
and sample client honeypot workflows. Section 4.3 looks at our Grid services
that form the ClientHoneypotManager and ClientHoneypotWrapper compo-
nents. Section 4.4 describes the implementation of our prototype system,
which includes: WSRF services, a Web portal and Taverna workflows. We
conclude the chapter, in Section 4.5, with a summary of the material covered.
4.1 Architecture
To meet the requirements we identified in Section 3.7—a user-oriented, loosely-
coupled and Grid-integrated system—we needed to expand the client honey-
pot architecture. Components were required that allow integration of existing
client honeypots, manage and provide access to these systems, and interface
with Grid middleware.
Our design uses a service-oriented architecture (SOA) approach; this pro-
vides a necessary level of abstraction and interoperability using common ser-
vices. Above these services we use workflows to manage the orchestration
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of services into larger processes, automating the complex operation of client
honeypot systems. A workflow system allows processes to be made into com-
ponents and should enable users of the system to create and modify these
complex processes with ideally little technical knowledge.
Figure 4.1 shows our system architecture. An existing client honeypot is
encapsulated with the ClientHoneypotWrapper services. Above this is the
ClientHoneypotManager component which acts as a broker between users
and registered client honeypots. It also interfaces with Grid services such as
job schedulers and SRBs. User access to the ClientHoneypotManager and
the workflow system is provided through a Web portal.
Client Honeypot Manager
Client Honeypot
Web Portal
Wrapper Services
GRAM
Job Scheduler
SRBWorkflow Sytem
Figure 4.1: Architecture diagram of our system design—items with dashed
lines are existing Grid components.
The ClientHoneypotWrapper WSRF services provide a standard interface
for all client honeypot instances. An implementation of this service can
either call an exposed API in the client honeypot or provide a bridge to the
application directly. The service can be deployed as a GRAM (Grid Resource
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Allocation Manager) job for submission to a job scheduler.
The ClientHoneypotManager will use Grid indexing services for publica-
tion and subscription of registered ClientHoneypotWrappers. Data published
could include the capabilities of the system, with specification of VM configu-
rations. Via the Web portal, users could then create a client honeypot session
by specifying only the URLs to test and any requirements for the system to
test on, letting the ClientHoneypotManager deal with the job scheduling and
the details of the client honeypot operation.
The orchestration of these WSRF services can be achieved either with a
custom application, requiring pre-compiled code and users to have program-
ming knowledge; or using workflow systems, graphically modelling the opera-
tion and potentially allowing non-technical users to create complex processes.
Initially we investigated how workflow systems could benefit our system.
4.2 Workflow Design
4.2.1 Areas of Application
We saw workflows as an important mechanisms for automating the various
processes used in client honeypot management. There are two main areas
where workflows are potentially beneficial: (1) operating a specific client
honeypot and (2) federation of multiple client honeypots. These are detailed
in the following two sections.
Operating a Client Honeypot
Each client honeypot implementation has its own internal processes. In a
high-interaction client honeypot the main process involves the server com-
ponent delegating URLs to client components, analysing any state changes,
then classifying the results. If the individual tasks that make up this process
where exposed as Web Services, the entire process could be modelled with
workflows. By using workflows the processes can be viewed graphically and
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modified by someone without technical expertise of that client honeypot.
An example of a potential modification to a process made via a change to
the workflow is the implementation of a divide-and-conquer algorithm [38].
This algorithm visits 20 URLs at once (in separate windows), and determines
if there is a malicious URL amongst them, if there is, the set will be divided
and re-tested until the malicious page or pages are determined. Due to the
low count of malicious pages making division rare, the parallel visiting of
pages increases throughput significantly. Such a change in the operation
process could be made by creating a new workflow and graphically inserting
the appropriate control structure such as while loops and if statements.
The previous operational behaviour would still be accessible through the
original workflow. This contrasts with the current approach where changes
require the server component to be recompiled and redeployed.
Tight control over the internal processes could also allow runtime mod-
ifications of the system through Web services. An example would be the
ClientHoneypotManager adding or subtracting CaptureClients as resources’
availability changed.
While fine-grained control of client honeypot systems is useful, it brings a
few disadvantages too. There will be a reasonable amount of work involved in
modifying any client honeypots to expose its internal tasks as Web services.
There will be a performance penalty due to the added communication and
overhead of SOAP messages used in Web services. Also, it may be difficult to
create standard interfaces so that workflows created for one client honeypot
are compatible with another client honeypot system. This is because each
system’s internal implementations is unique, data types and methods vary,
so code may need to be rewritten to enable convergence.
Federation of Client Honeypots
This approach treats a client honeypot as a black box to which we pass in
URLs and it passes out classification information, thus we are not concerned
with the internal workings. As well as the classification of a URL we can
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also gather useful additional meta data on the Web page itself, ie. popularity
of site (from ranking sites), geographic location of the Web server, number
of redirects, etc. Using this meta data, machine learning techniques can
be implemented to generate better profiles of malicious pages, eg. for the
formulation of signatures for low-interaction client honeypots [34].
Workflows can be used that filter URLs returned from one client honey-
pot using additional meta data, and pass matching URLs to another client
honeypot to inspect. An example could be a workflow that tested if client
honeypot location—in terms of country domain—affected whether the Web
page was delivered as malicious. The workflow might test an initial list of
URLs on a New Zealand honeypot, filter the resulting malicious URLs to
only those of high popularity, pass these URLs to a client honeypot located
the UK, and finally aggregate the results.
This approach to workflow usage would require a standard WSRF service
interface to be developed which can be applied to any client honeypot in-
stance. A specific client honeypot would then be wrapped with this generic
interface, requiring little or no modification to its existing code. The post-
processing of pages for additional meta data could be an extensible part of
the service.
4.2.2 BPEL and Taverna Evaluation
In Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 we gave an overview of the BPEL and Taverna
workflow systems. We now provide an evaluation of these systems for suit-
ability to model client honeypot workflows.
BPEL is a control-oriented workflow language. Its main strengths are its
maturity and wide support by industry tools and engines. Being a non-DAG
language it supports iteration (which is explicit), allowing complex control
structures to be expressed. A potential imitation of BPEL is it only supports
WSRF through an extension, but the extension is not compatible with the
current release (which has significant improvements in concurrency). Another
drawback is that the creation of workflows is a complicated process so is not
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suited to non-technical users. As one of the motivations we gave for using
workflows was to allow these non-techinical users to create and modify client
honeypot processes, this is significant.
Taverna is a data-oriented workflow language. Its strengths are: a simpler
system to develop workflows in, so non technical users should be able to
use it; and the integration of WSRF services is an example of the focus on
Grid computing. GSI security integration is also in development. Potential
limitations include the lack of explicit iteration affecting workflow design, and
the system’s immaturity—meaning there are bugs and functionality lacking
in some areas.
The two approaches to workflow usage we identified in the previous
section—operating a specific client honeypot and federation of multiple client
honeypots—have different requirements for the workflow system they are im-
plemented in. We now look at how these requirements apply to BPEL and
Taverna.
The control-oriented operation of a specific client honeypot fits the BPEL
workflow design, particularly the ability to include iteration. The increased
complexity of BPEL workflow design is not a significant issue because it
would likely be users with technical knowledge that would modify internal
honeypot processes.
The federation of multiple client honeypots is more of a data-oriented
process so suits Taverna’s model better. The simpler design process of Tav-
erna will benefit non-technical users, and the integration to the Grid is more
important at this higher data-processing level than it is at the lower control-
oriented level.
In the next two sections we will begin modelling these two workflow ap-
proaches with the counterpart workflow languages we have identified—BPEL
and Taverna.
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4.2.3 BPEL Workflows for Client Honeypot Modelling
To assess the expressability of BPEL as a workflow language for operating a
client honeypot we constructed workflows to model the operation of our case
study, Capture-HPC. We applied the constructs and semantics of WS-BPEL
version 2.0, currently the latest version. Of interest, this version introduces
new activity types of <repeatUntil>, and <forEach> (with both parallel
and sequential versions).
We now describe some of the issues encountered using BPEL and present
example workflows that try to address these identified issues. The function-
ality of Capture-HPC is exposed as Web services and the workflows invoke
and receive calls from these Web services. For ease of communication we
have chosen to model our workflows graphically, however there is no standard
graphical notation for BPEL. Most vendors have invented their own notation
or use the BPMN (Business Process Modelling Notation). These notations
all use a flowchart model—such as that used in UML activity diagrams—
with the addition of a block structure. At this stage we have modelled our
workflows in a simple graphical notation, Figure 4.2 shows a key for the dif-
ferent constructs used. At a later stage, when a workflow engine and tools
have been selected, we can map to the appropriate notation used.
An issue that we encountered when using BPEL was that the specifica-
tion does not define what happens if a workflow blocking for a <receive>
call, receives more than one call to the Web service. Therefore we cannot
use a single <receive> to deal with all clients returning results to the Cap-
tureServer in the Captue-HPC system. To avoid this we could implement
many top level workflows as a single BPEL engine can handle hundreds of
concurrent instances.
Figure 4.3 shows a workflow modelling the operation of Capture-HPC
using the <forEach> construct. The CaptureServer is initially passed a list
of URLs. For each registered CaptureClient a while loop is run in parallel.
This passes a URL to the CaptureClient to visit, receives state changes,
and determines if the Web server is malicious—in which case it resets the
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Start/End
Task
Loop
Decison
Block
Start and end points to the workflow
Individual tasks performed in the workflow. This 
can be invoking another workflow or Web 
service, blocking for a receiving a call from 
another Web service, or performing a simple 
operation such as manipulating variables.
A basic construct doing a Boolean test and 
taking different paths depending on the result.
A basic construct of For and While loops.
Used to group sequential blocks together for use 
in parallel or in loops.
Shows the flow of execution within the workflow
As above, but used for showing parallel 
execution of blocks within a workflow
Figure 4.2: Workflow diagrams’ key.
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VM that the CaptureClient is running inside. The network data captured is
transferred to a storage location and the URL classification list is updated.
These loops continue until there are no more URLs left to test, whereby
the classification list is returned. By having a separate <receive> for each
CaptureClient in its parallel loop we avoid the issue of multiple calls to a
single <receive>.
The <forEach> construct allows for the execution of a sequential block an
arbitrary number of times in parallel. The number of concurrent instances
of this block can be determined at run time before actual execution, but
once it has begun there is no way to add another concurrent instance. To
fully control a honeypot’s operation we need to delegate URLs to clients
in parallel, and allow the number of these connected clients to increase or
decrease during operation.
Figure 4.4 shows an example workflow that avoids this concurrency lim-
itation. Initially CaptureServer receives a list of URLs. Then two processes
are run in parallel—the first delegates URLs to free CaptureClients until
there are no more left to delegate, the second performs routine checks for
timeout conditions on assigned URLs until all tasks are completed. Both
update status lists to keep track of CaptureClients and URLs. When both
parallel branches have completed the findings are returned.
An event handler is used to receive the results from CaptureClients. The
specification states that a business process can receive event handler messages
concurrently with the normal activity of the scope to which the event handler
is attached, thus allowing events to occur at arbitrary times while the normal
scope is still active [27]. Using this design clients can be added and removed
by modifying the status lists, thus avoiding the fixed concurrency issue of
the <forEach> construct.
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Start Receive list of URLs
Receive state 
changes from 
CaptureClient
Invoke Client 
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malicious
Update 
Classification 
List
Figure 4.3: BPEL workflow of CaptureServer’s operation with parallel forE-
ach construct. Parallel while loops are run for each registered CaptureClient,
delegating URLs and processing results.
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Figure 4.4: BPEL workflow modelling CaptureServer delegating URLs to
CaptureClients. Parallel processes delegate URLs and check timeout condi-
tions, while an event handler processes results.
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4.2.4 Taverna Workflows for Client Honeypot Federa-
tion
In this section we use Taverna to model data-oriented workflows operating
on wrapper WSRF services that will encapsulate specific client honeypots.
In the same way we did with the previous BPEL workflows, we will again
use a simple graphical notation (Figure 4.2 specifies the key). For simplicity,
some of the non-essential data flow lines are omitted.
Figure 4.5 shows a simple workflow that will process a URL list and re-
turn the output files (URL classification lists and log files). The inputs to the
workflow are the URL list and optionally configuration options for the client
honeypot. A resource key is created which will identify this particular client
honeypot session. Then the Process URL List method is called, passing
the resource key, URL files and any configuration options. This is a block-
ing method so while this is operating the Get Status method outputs the
progress. When the processing is complete the workflow will move on to get
the files. The method to get the file list will return multiple file names, using
Taverna’s implicit iteration, each of these files will be individually retrieved
in the Get File method.
Figure 4.6 shows a more complex workflow—processing URLs on two dif-
ferently configured systems—which is the use case we described in Section
3.6.1. The workflow tests whether a list of malicious URLs can exploit vul-
nerabilities on two differently configured systems. So a URL list is processed
on the first VM, then any malicious URLs are fed into the second VM for
further testing. The first section is the same as our previous process in Fig-
ure 4.5, the difference is the output is parsed (to create a new input URL
list from the output’s malicious list) and this list is input into the second
Process URL List call (also passing any configuration options). When the
output files are retrieved from this client honeypot session the results are
aggregated to provide classification lists for the URLs over the two systems.
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Figure 4.5: Taverna workflow modelling basic operation of a client honeypot.
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Figure 4.6: Taverna workflow modelling processing URLs on two differently
configured systems.
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4.3 Grid Service Design
In this section we describe the WSRF interfaces designed for the two main
components of our system—the ClientHoneypotManager and the ClientHoney-
potWrapper services. Not all details are provided—for example custom data
types—these are provided in Appendix C. In section 4.3.3 we present an in-
teraction diagram that shows these services and their methods in operation.
4.3.1 ClientHoneypotManager
The purpose of this service is to be a broker between users and a number of
registered client honeypots. The user initially creates a new session by calling
the initiateSession method, this returns a reference to the CHSessionMan-
ager service context. The registerClientHoneypot and deregisterClientHoney-
pot methods are used to add or remove a client honeypot’s information from
the indexing service. The methods are defined as:
• CHSessionManagerReference initiateSession ();
• void registerClientHoneypot (ClientHoneypotDescriptor info);
• void deregisterClientHoneypot (ClientHoneypotDescriptor info);
The CHSessionManager service context deals with a specific user’s ses-
sion. It stores a Session resource (see section below for complex type defini-
tions). It has methods processURLs and terminateProcessing for starting or
stopping processing a list of URLs, and getStatus to get info on the current
session. These methods are defined as:
• String processURLs (int priority, ClientHoneypotConfig settings, Base64Binary
urlListFile, Reference endpointRef);
• void terminateProcessing ();
• SessionStatus getStatus ();
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4.3.2 ClientHoneypotWrapper
This service is designed to provide a WSRF wrapper for client honeypots.
The aim is to use a standardised generic client honeypot interface so that
the ClientHoneypotManager has a single service type to interact with. Each
client honeypot system (ie. Capture-HPC, HoneyMonkey, etc.) will require a
different implementation of this interface, but the service will be designed so
that these specific implementations require minimal changes at the back-end
to interact with the honeypots they are wrapping.
We have based this service on the services that the authoring tool gRAVI
creates to wrap legacy applications (described in Section 2.2.4). This ability
to wrap command-line applications with little code modification fits with
what we require. To implement these services we will have to standardise
the parameters and data types. Additionally we may need to extend the
gRAVI services to integrate resource allocation.
If we were to write these services by hand—without gRAVI—we would
have to write: low level Globus Toolkit code such as configuring resources,
maintenance code such as updating the service context’s state, code for han-
dling the various error conditions arising in the services, and client code for
testing and debugging.
The main service has the operation createResultsResource which returns
a new reference which is used to refer to this particular session. The run-
ClientHoneypotSh method will start the client honeypot with the provided
arguments and files (such as URL lists and configuration files). The resRef
parameter is optional, if null is provided a new reference is created and this
value is returned.
• ResourceReference createResultsResource ();
• ResourceReference runClientHoneypotSh (ResourceReference resRef,
String[] arguments, String[] filenames, Base64Binary[] inputFiles);
The service context for the client honeypot session has a number of meth-
ods for transferring files, requesting the status, and terminating processing.
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These are defined as:
• String[] getFileList();
• Base64Binary getSingleFileSOAP(String filename);
• Status getStatus();
• boolean killProcess();
• boolean sendFileSOAP(String filename, Base64Binary inputFile);
The methods provided for transfering files via SOAP also have GridFTP
versions (see Appendix C).
4.3.3 Interaction Diagram
Figure 4.7 shows a sequence diagram modelling the sequential operation of
the services we have specified in the previous two sections. This shows the
process of initiating a session and the user submitting a URL-list to be pro-
cessed. The manager looks up a suitable client honeypot, creates a resource
and starts processing. Status is periodically checked and a call-back is pro-
vided to the user. When processing is completed the files are transferred
and the manager returns the location of these files to the user. The status
can also be checked directly from the user, separate from the periodic status
updates. The User component could either be a workflow, Web portal, or
other application; while the Capture-HPC class could be replaced with any
specific client honeypot.
4.4 System Implementation
In this section we describe the proof-of-concept implementation of our sys-
tem design. Figure 4.8 shows the components of our implemented system.
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Figure 4.7: Sequence diagram showing the interaction of components in our
system when processing a list of URLs.
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At the bottom of the diagram we have have an unmodified client honeypot—
in our initial implementation this is Capture-HPC. Above this is a custom
shell script which provides a bridge between the generalisation of the wrap-
per services and specification of our specific client honeypot—Capture-HPC.
Above the custom shell script is the ClientHoneypotWrapper WSRF service
which is a standardised component, requiring only the filepath to the custom
script to be modified and a unique service URL given when deployed. The
wrapper service and script implementations are described further in Section
4.4.1. Above this is the Web portal (described in Section 4.4.2) and the Tav-
erna workflow engine and user interface components (described in Section
4.4.3). We use these workflow components to design and enact workflows
that operate on our WSRF wrapper services.
Each of the described components can be located on different physical
machines, allowing flexibility in deployment. The Taverna workflow system
can be considered one part of the ClientHoneypotManger component, the
rest has been omitted to save time.
4.4.1 Custom Script and Wrapper Services
The custom Unix shell script converts the standardised parameters and data
types of the WSRF service to the specifics of Capture-HPC. The script also
adds functionality not in CaptureServer such as terminating processing and
outputting progress statistics. The usage of this intermediate script means
there is no need to modify either the existing client honeypot system or the
WSRF services. Developers of other client honeypots could simply write
their own ‘wrapper’ script to also use our WSRF services.
An alternative with tighter integration is to modify the WSRF services
to call an API that the client honeypot exposes. Capture-HPC 2.5 does not
currently expose an API.
The WSRF Grid services we use are the core services created by gRAVI.
These can be deployed to either a Globus container or an Apache Tomcat
installation that has the GT4 libraries installed. They also have the ability
CHAPTER 4. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 58
Custom Shell 
Script
Unmodified 
Client Honeypot 
System
Web Portal 
Access
ClientHoneypot
Wrapper WSRF 
service
Taverna 
Workflow 
Engine
Taverna User 
InterfaceUser
Figure 4.8: Component diagram of our prototype system.
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to be deployed as a GRAM job but we have not integrated it with any
job schedulers. This means that currently there is no resource allocation
mechanism to limit to single user access of high-interaction client honeypots’
resources. This would be necessary for most high-interaction client honeypots
in a production environment, as two instances could not use the same virtual
machines simultaneously.
In our tests of the services, options for security in the container were not
enabled.
4.4.2 Web Portal
The Web portal component of our system allows access to our ClientHoney-
potWrapper service through a Web browser. This basic Web application is
a modification of the one provided in gRAVI, Figure 4.9 shows a screenshot.
The user can upload URL lists and optional configuration files, and pass
standardised operational parameters to the service. After the user starts
the client honeypot, progress stats are displayed until processing is complete
whereby they can download the generated classifications. In our prototype
system the Web portal is not integrated with our Taverna workflows, though
it does allow the progress stats of workflows to be viewed if the resource key
from the workflow is imported.
4.4.3 Taverna Workflows
In this section we describe our experiences of using Taverna to implement the
workflows we designed in Section 4.2.4. There were a number of problems
we encountered, the main issues were:
• A GUI bug in Taverna 2.0 prevented us scavenging the WSDL for our
services. When the WSDLs for the main service and the context service
are both added, the service’s methods were merged with around half
the method names not displayed, meaning it was impossible to add
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Figure 4.9: Screenshot of our Web portal accessing the ClientHoneypotWrap-
per service, encapsulating Capture-HPC.
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these methods to the workflow. The previous version, Taverna 1.7.1,
does not have this issue.
• The lack of WSRF support in 1.7.1, however, meant we had to change
all the service context methods to pass the resource key as a parameter
rather than the SOAP header as WSRF services should. When the
resource key is explicitly passed the functionality remains the same,
meaning it is more of an inconvenience that we lose the transparency
of WS addressing.
• Another bug is that Taverna creates a malformed SOAP request for any
method that doesn’t have any parameters, throwing a security excep-
tion. To work around this we had to again change the WSRF services
to add dummy parameters to any methods with empty parameter lists.
• We found that once we started processing a list of URLs using the run-
ClientHoneypotSh method we could not get regular status updates on
the progress. This was partially due to the lack of explicit iteration in
Taverna, but even with a workflow language with explicit iteration—
such as BPEL—this functionality would be difficult to achieve. This is
because a workflow is like a service and only outputs values at comple-
tion, so intermediate values would need to be passed to another service.
So this type of publish/subscribe mechanism for notifications from ser-
vices is a feature lacking from all workflow systems, not just Taverna.
To get around this issue we had to write the resource reference for the
service context to a file using a BeanShell script, the user is then able
to input it into the Web portal to check progress.
• A limitation of the BeanShell implementation in Taverna 1.7.1 is the
object types of the inputs and outputs into the BeanShell processor.
These inputs and outputs must be specified from a predefined list and
are variations of strings and binary data, multiplicity can be specified
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as multi-dimensional lists1. This limits the usefulness of the BeanShell
system as a number of Web services will use custom types and other
primitive types such as arrays. We have found that other types can
be output from these beanshells (ie. an array can be passed out even
if the output was specified as a list) because it just passes a reference
to the object and the next processor can cast it as needed. This does
not work with the inputs as they are declared as their Taverna types
before they are assigned values, so would cause class cast exceptions if
cast to any other types. Taverna 2.0 addresses this issue.
• We found the process of workflow creation quite tedious. For each
service method used, XML splitters for input had to be added and
uniquely named. The local services (built-in functions) lacked simple
operations, eg. converting a list (which Taverna uses for all collections)
to an array, meaning these operations had to be written as new Bean-
Shell scripts. These scripts had to be written multiple times—if needed
more than once—as Taverna does not allow you to reuse them.
Figure 4.10 shows the Taverna implementation of our earlier designed
workflow—for basic operation of a client honeypot—that we gave in Figure
4.5. The service calls (in green) are matched, the additions are the XML
splitter (in purple) and BeanShells (in brown) for splitting and parsing the
data. Specifically, BeanShell scripts were needed for parsing filepaths to
filename strings, loading the files into Base64 encoded byte arrays, converting
ArrayLists to arrays, and writing the resource reference to file. For simplicity
this diagram omits some details, such as the individual ports on the XML-
splitters and string constants.
Figure 4.11 shows the Taverna implementation of our earlier more com-
plex workflow for processing URLs on two differently configured systems—
originally shown in Figure 4.6. In this workflow we utilise some of the sec-
tions from the previous Taverna workflow—method calls, XML-splitters, and
1In Taverna they are called lists though they are actually the Java ArrayList type.
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Figure 4.10: Taverna workflow modelling the basic operation of a client hon-
eypot.
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BeanShells—through the use of nested workflows.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter we have taken the requirements we formulated in Chapter
3 and designed a user-oriented, loosely-coupled and Grid-integrated system
using WSRF services and workflows.
We investigated the areas that workflows can be applied to client honey-
pots, finding that they are useful for both operating a specific client honeypot,
and the federation of multiple client honeypots. Our analysis showed that
these two areas have different requirements for workflows languages, the first
being more suited to control-oriented languages such as BPEL, and the sec-
ond suiting data-oriented languages such as Taverna. The expressibility of
both languages was assessed by graphically modelling sample workflows.
From our overall design we implemented a prototype system, encapsulat-
ing Capture-HPC—our case study client honeypot—with a shell script and
Grid services created with Introduce and gRAVI. Access to the Capture-
HPC functionality is provided through a Web portal. Taverna workflows
were created to implement the sample use cases we described in Section 3.6.
In the next chapter we will evaluate our system, determining if it meets
the requirements and whether it is an improvement on alternative system
designs.
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Figure 4.11: Taverna workflow implemented for processing URLs on two
differently configured systems.
Chapter 5
Evaluation
This evaluation chapter covers a number of different aspects of our system.
Firstly, in Section 5.1 we assess how well our original system requirements
are met.
One of the most important aspects of our system is the workflow com-
ponent, used for modelling and managing tasks. So in Section 5.2 we define
a set of criteria to enable us to make qualitative assessments of workflow
systems, including Taverna and alternative designs. These alternatives in-
clude a manual script-based system and a Java system that uses our WSRF
services. We also evaluate the authoring tools used to create these services.
Section 5.3 evaluates our Taverna workflow against the two alternatives.
As part of this evaluation we created a Java application, operating on our
WSRF wrapper services—implementing one of our Taverna workflows.
In Section 5.4 we look at the wider issue of applicability of workflow
systems to our domain, including missing features and requirements from
other Internet instruments.
Finally, in Section 5.5 we summarise our findings.
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5.1 Fulfilment of Requirements
In this section we evaluate our system to determine how well it meets the
requirements we formulated in Chapter 3. These were derived from our ex-
perience of manually operating Capture-HPC for moderate scale scans over
a period of seven months. In Section 4.4 we showed how our implementa-
tion satisfied the use cases we had created in Section 3.6. We focused our
research on the key requirements—a system that is user-oriented, loosely-
coupled and Grid-integrated. We now assess how well we have met each of
these requirements.
We aimed to design a user-oriented system that focused on how the
user wants to interact with the system, hiding unnecessary detail. Our
Taverna workflows have addressed the use cases we specified in Section
3.6. Through our Web portal users can access client honeypots much more
easily—previously users had to log onto the machine physically or remotely
via SSH. All configuration options are optional and are standardised be-
tween client honeypots where possible, thus abstracting specific system de-
tail. Choice is provided to users of variable levels of detail in the status
updates given via the Web portal. Our ClientHoneypotManager component
provides a user-oriented distributed broker with indexing services so that
users can simply submit a URL list and system specification to the broker
service which will deal with the actual allocation.
Secondly, we were looking for a loosely-coupled system, providing inter-
operability of client honeypot systems. Our WSRF Web services provide
standard interfaces to wrap any client honeypot system, including both high
and low-interaction versions. No changes need be made to existing client
honeypots if either an intermediary custom shell script is written or an API
is exposed.
Thirdly, we wanted a system that is Grid-integrated, to utilise the many
Grid resources available, provide a flexible de-centralised architecture and
promote interoperability over multiple sites. Our system uses WSRF services,
allows GridFTP file transfers, and has a de-centralised design. It is able to
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be integrated into GRAM for resource managers to control allocation of VM
resources. Underlying Grid security can be implemented via options in the
service container, allowing the services to be potentially securely used within
a virtual organisation.
5.2 Evaluation Methodology
Our methodology was to develop evaluation criteria (shown in Section 5.2.1),
implement three versions of workflows—using shell scripts, Taverna and Java—
and evaluate this experience. The Taverna and Java versions both have
shared features—the WSRF services created with the authoring tools Intro-
duce and gRAVI—which we evaluate in Section 5.2.2.
5.2.1 Criteria
We have devised the below criteria covering six important areas for evaluat-
ing our use of workflow technologies, the aim being to use this to perform
qualitative assessments of each workflow version (shell scripts, Taverna and
Java), allowing comparisons to be drawn.
• Required knowledge—the technical knowledge of the tools a user of the
system requires to create and modify a client honeypot process, for
instance in our system the required knowledge will relate to Taverna
and workflows languages in general. This also includes any low-level
knowledge of specific client honeypots if this is not abstracted.
• Modifying workflows—this will be an analysis of the effort required to
modify existing client honeypot workflows. A possible change could be
an existing process that feeds data from one client honeypot to another
and we want to modify this to anonymise the data. Our assessment
would be the effort required for this change.
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• Maintainability—the ease with which users can maintain these work-
flows. This is particularly important for complex workflows, because
errors become more likely as complexity increases. Mechanisms such
as dividing into components will help the maintainability.
• Extensibility—the ability to extend the core functionality of the work-
flow. Unlike modifying workflows, this is adding significant function-
ality to the end of the workflow. Of particular interest is the means
to extend the workflow to include data analysis, eg. adding a function
that generates some meta data to each malicious URL, such as the IP
address of the Web server.
• Understandability—the ease with which a user can interpret a new pro-
cess introduced to them, particularly important for complex processes.
A graphical representation will help understandability.
• Dealing with failure—this is the ability to handle errors and recover to
carry on operation if possible. Of interest are errors that occur related
to client honeypot operation, eg. if an invalid configuration option is
given, or a VMWare Server crashes. Ideally there will be fine-grained
control of errors.
5.2.2 Shared Features
In this section we evaluate the tools we used to generate our WSRF Grid
services—Introduce and its plugin gRAVI.
Prior to using Introduce we had looked into the development of Web
services in Java. Even with a number of APIs available for Web services
it did not appear a straightforward solution, particularly as we wanted to
use WSRF services which are not well supported. The Introduce toolkit
generated thousands of lines of code, saving us a significant amount of time.
We found Introduce to be a stable Java application with a well-constructed
GUI for defining and deploying the services.
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By using the gRAVI plugin we saved further time, as this tool generated
hundreds of lines of code. The code for handling file transfer, both with
SOAP and GridFTP was particularly useful. From taking a number of days
to write basic service skeletons, we could create full services in a number
of hours. This follows similar experiences of another researcher who had
spent over a month developing basic Web services for accessing a physics
application, and later used gRAVI to create full services in less than two
days [43].
A feature that would improve Introduce would be an integrated data type
creation tool that automatically updates the types used the service. Cur-
rently, custom data types have to be created manually using XML-schema
documents, and if changes are made to existing data types the affected meth-
ods have to reconstructed.
A few minor features which would improve gRAVI are: SOAP attach-
ments, and delegation as part of the GSI security.
5.3 Evaluation against Taverna Workflows
We now compare our Taverna workflow system to alternative system designs—
a manual system using shell scripts and a Java-based system that uses our
WSRF services—using the criteria we presented earlier.
In Section 5.3.3 we summarise this semi-taxonomy with a table that com-
pares the three alternative systems, assigning a star rating to each criterion.
5.3.1 Manual System with Scripts
In this section we compare our system’s Taverna workflow design and enact-
ment to the previous manual and script-based approach—previously used for
the management of client honeypots. The following is our comparison using
each of the criteria we stated in Section 5.2.1:
Required knowledge: The manual approach requires shell scripting ex-
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perience and detailed knowledge of the specific client honeypot being
used. Our workflow approach requires knowledge of workflows and
Taverna but no knowledge of specific client honeypot details, such as
configuration options, components, and data formats.
So, in terms of scalability, when using our workflow system the required
knowledge would remain static if we increased the size of the modelled
process to include the operation of two or three different client honey-
pots. However, if using a script-based system, the technical knowledge
would increase, with details of each client honeypot system needed to
be known.
Modifying workflows: There is a similar amount of effort required for both
approaches. Changes would require lines of script changed or processors
changed in a workflow. These changes could mean either the script
parameters and return values could change, affecting other scripts; or
workflow inputs and data flow changes could affect sub-workflows and
super-workflows.
For example, adding an anonymising function would require a new shell
script to be written with the input data types matching the first client
honeypot’s output, and the script’s output data types to match the
second client honeypot. The top level control script would need to be
modified to call this new script and deal with passing the data. The
workflow approach would require a new anonymising processor between
the the two client honeypots, either as a BeanShell script or a service
call, and the appropriate data flow lines changed.
Maintainability: Any shell scripts will be specific to one particular client
honeypot system and usually a specific deployment. Therefore, there
is a lack or code sharing and testing which adds to the maintenance
overhead. Scripts can be more error prone to bugs in the code (eg. a
missed parameter passed) and require documentation.
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Workflows can be shared and applied to other systems with little, or
no, modification. A data flow language like Taverna is easier to match
inputs and outputs of processors, though the type checking is limited
and BeanShell scripting is error-prone.
Extensibility: Scripts are well-suited for pipelining simple text but not
complex multi-value data types which have to be precisely matched
from one output script to the next input script. Larger scale data anal-
ysis is suited to parallel operations and Grid processing, supported by
workflows but not simple shell scripts.
Understandability: Small-scale scripts are easily understood, but for more
complex processes the scripts will need to be divided into components
and well documented to remain understandable. The graphical repre-
sentation of our workflows communicates the process effectively (until
we get to large processes), particularly the data flow between processors
and sub-workflow components.
Dealing with failure: Neither scripts or Taverna workflows deal with fail-
ure particularly well. Both will output what error has occurred but
it is difficult to code any error handling into the processes. Alterna-
tive workflow languages, such as BPEL, offer better exception handling
than Taverna.
In summary, for small-scale processes—operating on a client honeypot
that the user is familiar with—the scripting method is adequate. But for
any larger scale processes using more than one client honeypot, requiring
code reuse or data processing, our workflow approach is significantly better
suited.
5.3.2 Java & Web Services System
In the previous section we showed how our system design was an improvement
on the existing manual management method of using shell scripts. We now
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evaluate our system against another alternative system design.
The service-oriented architecture of our design is effective for a loosely-
coupled and Grid integrated system. Therefore, the WSRF services for wrap-
ping and managing client honeypot systems appear a solid design with few
obvious alternatives. However, the effectiveness of the mechanism we use for
managing the processes that consist of these services (the workflow system
in our design) is less clear and requires further evaluation.
An alternative system design is a Java application that controls the or-
chestration of Web services. The Java application can then use our WSRF
wrapper services to control client honeypots, combining these services to
form complex processes in the same way workflows do.
As part of this evaluation we wrote a basic Java application that imple-
ments our workflow in Figure 4.11 for processing URLs on two differently
configured systems1. This was relatively straightforward, with less than a
hundred lines of code needed—this was partly because we could use some of
the Introduce generated client code to hide service invocation detail. The cre-
ation of this Java application provides a point of comparison to our Taverna
workflow designs. High-level scripting languages such as Ruby and Python
would be alternatives to our use of Java.
Rather than a standalone application, this type of system could also be a
JSP (Java Server Page) based Web application, or deployed as a Web service
the same way workflows can be exposed in languages such as BPEL.
We now compare this Java application design to our Taverna workflow
approach, again we use the criteria we defined in Section 5.2.1:
Required knowledge: A Java application approach to coding the service
would require only reasonable knowledge of Java programming and
some knowledge of Web service invocation. The workflow approach
requires quite detalied knowledge of the workflow language and the tool
used to design the workflows. Data flow languages such as Taverna are
simpler to learn than BPEL (due to the lower complexity and integrated
1The code for this application is provided in Appendix D
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graphical editors), but are still not straightforward, and our experience
has shown that Java code is often required inside the workflow via
BeanShell scripts.
The Taverna workflow design tool is a stand-alone application. This
means it will be separate to the Web portal interface we use for sys-
tem access and no customisations can be made to the workflow design
system to make it more domain specific. Whereas, a Java application
could have its own custom interface for modifying the processes, and
target this towards client honeypots. If this type of dynamic applica-
tion was used it would also remove the need for any Java knowledge
to use such a process-modification system, though this would require
significant development work.
Modifying workflows: A well-designed Java application should generally
not require great effort to modify an existing process, both for small
and large changes. This is because objects, methods and variables can
easily be added, removed, or modified, and the strongly-typed system
will ensure the changes are well-formed.
Small changes to a Taverna workflow, such as adding a new processor
between two existing processors, can be achieved quite easily as this
just requires the modification of input and output data-flows. Larger
changes are more difficult because the data flow will need to be pre-
served but may need multiple changes which is error-prone without a
strongly typed system, and the GUI based system limits changes such
as “cutting” and “pasting” sections of a workflow.
For example, changing a parameter in a Web service method’s signature
from a boolean to an int would require only a text search and replace
to change the Java method calls and the generated stubs to be rebuilt.
However, using the Taverna GUI would require the WSDL to be re-
added, and each of those existing method processors and XML-splitters
deleted and the new version re-added and associated XML-splitters
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created. The underlying XML of the workflow could be edited by hand
outside Taverna, though it would not be desirable to expect users to
have to do this, and be error prone for large modifications.
Maintainability: Both system designs should be quite simple to maintain
because they can both be divided into manageable components. The
Java application approach is better suited to debugging, with integrated
debuggers available. Debugging in Taverna is limited, break-points
can be set but we cannot inspect data-flow values or step through the
BeanShell scripts.
Error checking is also an advantage for compiled Java application code,
compared to the interpreted code in Taverna.
Extensibility: The componentisation of both system designs will allow ex-
tensibility to be easily implemented. However, Taverna is better suited
for scientific data analysis because of the mechanisms available for
pipelining, parallel execution and Grid integration. Data analysis is
an important part of the client honeypot process, and data gathered
with high-interaction client honeypots can be used to formulate the
signatures used in the high-speed low-interaction client honeypots [34].
Understandability: It is questionable which approach is more understand-
able and probably depends on individual users’ preferences—some may
prefer a pure code view, while others may prefer a graphical model. An
advantage of the pure code view of a Java application is the ability to
easily add comments to code to help readability, which is not possible
in Taverna. Another consideration of the graphical approach is that
there is still code in the processes, located in BeanShell scripts, which
takes more effort to access than a complete code listing. Some of the
drawbacks of the graphical approach are due to the immaturity of the
tools and improvements are likely to be made.
Dealing with failure: Java has a much better exception handling system
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which gives fine-grained control of recovering from errors arising from
client honeypots. Taverna has poor error handling and workflows will
exit upon any errors encountered with no recovery options available.
For example, if a data analysis service went offline, in Java the exception
handler could skip this service (or use an alternative), but in Taverna
the entire workflow would exit after the specified number of service
retries failed.
Taverna relies on error handling to be implemented in the services
themselves. Tools external to the workflow may need to be used to
recover from error and start processing again. For example, if an ex-
ception was thrown before the workflow could retrieve and parse the
output files from a client honeypot, then this may have to be done by
another clean-up workflow, or manually.
To summarise these findings, we have determined that the Java applica-
tion approach improves on required knowledge, modifying workflows, dealing
with failure, and slightly better for maintainability. The undertandability of
both approaches is quite even, though improvements to Taverna’s GUI could
change this. The area that our Taverna workflows have an advantage is
extensibility, specifically the data analysis phase.
5.3.3 Comparison Summary
Table 5.1 summarises our findings, comparing the three system designs on
the five identified criteria. We assign a star rating to show if that criterion
is a strength or a weakness.
One area that we have not yet covered is performance in terms of process-
ing speed. Because high-interaction client honeypots need to wait a number
of seconds per URL to determine state changes—ten in our experiment—any
additional processing will be a small fraction of this delay, so we do not see
computational overhead/performance as a critical factor. The script-based
approach differs because the shell scripts are generally run locally, whereas
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Table 5.1: Comparison of system designs. Each criterion is given a star
rating—one star is weak, three is satisfactory, and five is strong.
Manual script-
based
Taverna Java application
Required knowl-
edge
FF FFF FFFF
Modifying work-
flows
FFF FFF FFFFF
Maintainability FF FFF FFFF
Extensibility FF FFFFF FFF
Understandability FF FFF FFF
Dealing with failure F F FFFFF
the other two Web service approaches have the overhead of protocols (such
as SOAP) that will be slower. However indirect performance benefits are
gained through distribution, the ability to offload to remote providers, sim-
ple parallelism through multiple services, and Grid computing.
5.4 Generalisation of Evaluation
In the previous sections we have evaluated our system against manual script-
based operation and a Java application approach, particularly looking at our
Taverna workflow approach. We now want to take a step back and look
at how applicable workflow systems in general are to our domain, client
honeypots specifically, but also more widely for Internet instruments.
Workflow technology appeared promising because it is a system that is
dedicated to controlling processes constructed of Web services, with the
control-oriented language BPEL widely used in the business sector, and a
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number of data-oriented languages used in scientific areas. These workflow
systems are presented as options for non-technical users to be able to ma-
nipulate complex service-based processes, but our experience suggests that
even relatively simple workflows need significant low-level code to work. An
illustration of this is the differences from our preliminary workflow designs
we created to their actual implementations. Figure 4.6 showed our prelimi-
nary workflow for modelling processing URLs on two differently configured
systems, Figure 4.8 was the actual Taverna implementation. The first model
shows 15 processors, but the implementation has 46 processors. This is due
to additions for the XML-splitters, local processors for doing basic type con-
versions, and nine BeanShell scripts for doing other conversions and loading
files. This changes a relatively straight-forward model into quite a complex
one, with increased effort both to construct and to understand it.
In Section 4.4.3 we outlined a number of issues we encountered using Tav-
erna. This is somewhat understandable given that workflows are a relatively
new area of research, with a large number of systems and little convergence,
especially in the data-oriented languages. We will now identify some useful
functionality not already in workflow systems.
The main piece of functionality we would like to see is a publish/subscribe
mechanism for workflows to get status updates from WSRF services and
notify users. Services generated by Introduce provide subscription options
so that a service user can provide an endpoint reference so they can receive
call-backs on resource state changes. A mechanism could be provided in the
workflow language to subscribe to this type of method and specify how any
notifications should be dealt with, ie. notifying the workflow user. This type
of functionality would allow us to subscribe a workflow to a client honeypot
while is has invoked a processing job, providing updated status and possibly
perform actions depending on upon this status.
More minor functionality we would like to see includes better exception
handling, automatic code generation (such as for XML-splitters), an inte-
grated debugger, easier conversion of types, and an improved GUI with easily
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adjustable levels of detail for displaying a model.
Some of our experience is driven by the type of application we are devel-
oping for, and the workflow system we have used. Therefore, we acknowledge
that generalisation of our experiences may be limited. We have not found
any other published experiences of workflow usage in the same or similar
domains, so there is little to compare our findings with.
The domain we are interested in appears to have elements of both control-
oriented and data-oriented workflow system, but these are currently divergent
focuses of workflow systems. If this is not a unique requirement, a combined
approach to workflow systems could be developed. The maturity and design
of BPEL would appear to limit changes in orientation, so it may be more
feasibly for scientific workflow languages such as Taverna to become more
control oriented—a first step would be explicit iteration.
It is interesting to look at other Internet instruments to determine what
requirements they would have from workflows. A network telescope would
appear to fit a data-oriented workflow language due to its passive data col-
lection requiring very little control. This contrasts with the active data col-
lection requiring a high level control for a client honeypot system. A network
telescope requires significant data processing to get useful information so this
suits the parallel and pipelined nature of a data driven workflow.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter we have conducted a number of evaluations, we now briefly
summarise each.
We evaluated the Grid service authoring tools we used, Introduce and
gRAVI, finding them solid toolkits for service creation, saving developers
significant time and effort.
Next, we compared our Web service and Taverna workflow system to
our experiences to the manually managed script-based system we formed
our requirements from. We found that our system satisfied the identified
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requirements of being user-oriented, loosely-coupled and Grid-integrated. For
anything apart from small-scale workflows our system scored better for the
criteria we assessed upon than the script-based operation.
We created a Java application that enacted our WSRF services as an
alternative system design for comparison. We found that the Java approach
was better suited on most of the criteria we assessed upon—modifying work-
flows, maintainability, and dealing with failure. The main area that Tav-
erna workflows showed an improvement was extensibility with good support
for data analysis through pipelining. Also, Taverna was good in terms of
usability—with a drag and drop GUI, minimum knowledge needed of under-
lying technology, and the ability to pass a workflow to a colleague which will
work in their Taverna.
The choice of which approach should be taken—Taverna or Java—will de-
pend upon the requirements of a specific project, ie. weighing how important
integrated data analysis mechanisms are compared to fault-handling and the
required technical knowledge for users.
Finally, we used our experiences with workflows to assess their applicabil-
ity to our domain. We found that, with some improvements, workflows could
be beneficial to our research area, particularly with the end-to-end control of
processes, from data collection to data analysis. Workflow technology may
however be better suited to Internet instruments with passive data collection,
such as network telescopes. We have identified some functionality that would
improve workflow systems, most significantly a publish/subscribe system for
workflows to monitor the state of WSRF resources.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1 Summary of Thesis
The goal of this research is to enhance the previous manual script-based
approach to client honeypot management. Our prototype uses WSRF ser-
vices for wrapping client honeypots, Taverna to model and enact complex
workflows, and a Web portal for access.
Our evaluation showed that while our system design satisfied our func-
tional requirements, a Java-based application operating on our WSRF ser-
vices provides a number of advantages over the Taverna approach used in our
system—particularly for modifying workflows, maintainability, and dealing
with failure. However, Taverna workflows are better suited to the data analy-
sis phase of client honeypot operation and have some usability benefits—such
as a drag and drop GUI, minimum knowledge of underlying technology, and
the ability to easily share workflows. Workflow languages such as Taverna
are still relatively immature, so improvements are likely to be made. Both
of these approaches are significantly easier to manage and deploy than the
previous script-based method.
We now attempt to answer our two research questions. The first was:
How can we effectively create systems of different client honeypots
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to perform measurements and analysis?
Our research indicates that using WSRF services with standard inter-
faces designed to wrap a generic client honeypot allows simple integration of
different existing systems, with minimal development effort. The standard
interfaces allows a manager component to act as a broker to users, abstracting
unnecessary system detail.
The second question was:
What is the best method to automate the various tasks that en-
compass client honeypot management?
Both Taverna and a Java application—operating on our WSRF wrapper
services—provide good methods of client honeypot management. The Java
approach could be considered better, but this judgment is largely dependent
on factors of specific projects, such as the level and structure of data analysis
and the benefit of a graphical notation.
6.2 Overall Contributions
The main contributions of this research are:
1. Creation of use cases to model system requirements of a client honeypot
automation system, based on our experience of manually managing a
system for moderate-scale scans over a period of several months.
2. Creation of WSRF Web services for wrapping any client honeypot,
with minimum effort. These can be used by workflow languages and
Java-based applications.
3. Implementation of workflows that use our services to model and control
complex processes used in client honeypot operation.
4. Experience with Introduce and gRAVI, two recently developed Grid
service authoring tools.
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5. Evaluation of the Taverna workflow system for modelling and enacting
client honeypot workflows–finding that Java was better for modifying
workflows, maintainability, and dealing with failure; while Taverna had
advantages in extensibility and areas of usability.
6.3 Future Work
The research we have conducted leads directly and indirectly to a number of
pieces of future work, this includes:
• Implement the ClientHoneypotManger component in our system.
• Expand the current workflows to include data processing and analysis
functionality after data collection.
• Expand our system implementation to operate over multiple organisa-
tions, with required security mechanisms such as delegation of creden-
tials.
• Modify a workflow engine to support a publish/subscribe mechanism
to Web service notifications, and output this data to users.
• Investigate the idea of a hybrid workflow system which has both control-
oriented and data-oriented aspects.
• Use our architecture for other Internet instruments, ie. network tele-
scopes.
• Investigate the use of cloud computing abilities into our architecture,
eg. recruiting resources on demand.
Appendix A
Sample Capture-HPC Log
This appendix is a sample Capture-HPC log for a malicious URL. The site—
http://blackmores.co.nz—was visited in September 2008. Each entry in
the log contains: the type of system activity (file, process, or registry), the
timestamp, and the data values relating to that system activity.
Of particular interest is: (1) the entry where the malicious executable is
downloaded:
"file","25/9/2008 6:49:50.515","C:\Program Files\Inte
rnet Explorer\IEXPLORE.EXE","Write","C:\msntstza.exe"
(2) the entry for the executable being loaded as a new process:
"process","25/9/2008 6:49:50.561","C:\Program Files\I
nternet Explorer\IEXPLORE.EXE","created","C:\msntstza
.exe"
The full listing follows (some repeated entries have been removed for
brevity):
"process","25/9/2008 6:49:49.983","C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\IEXPLORE.EXE",
"created","C:\WINDOWS\Temp\vv0QZXFd.com"
"file","25/9/2008 6:49:50.124","C:\WINDOWS\Temp\vv0QZXFd.com","Write","C:\WINDOWS\Te
mp\twe1.tmp"
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"file","25/9/2008 6:49:50.140","C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\IEXPLORE.EXE","Wr
ite","C:\WINDOWS\WindowsUpdate.log"
"registry","25/9/2008 6:49:50.202","C:\WINDOWS\Temp\vv0QZXFd.com","SetValueKey","HKL
M\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\MSSMGR\Data"
"file","25/9/2008 6:49:50.233","C:\WINDOWS\Temp\vv0QZXFd.com","Write","C:\WINDOWS\sy
stem32\winwpa32.dll"
"registry","25/9/2008 6:49:50.218","C:\WINDOWS\Temp\vv0QZXFd.com","SetValueKey","HKL
M\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\MSSMGR\LSTV"
"registry","25/9/2008 6:49:50.218","C:\WINDOWS\Temp\vv0QZXFd.com","SetValueKey","HKL
M\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\MSSMGR\Brnd"
"registry","25/9/2008 6:49:50.233","C:\WINDOWS\Temp\vv0QZXFd.com","SetValueKey","HKL
M\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify\winwpa32\Asynchron
ous"
"registry","25/9/2008 6:49:50.233","C:\WINDOWS\Temp\vv0QZXFd.com","SetValueKey","HKL
M\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify\winwpa32\DllName"
"registry","25/9/2008 6:49:50.233","C:\WINDOWS\Temp\vv0QZXFd.com","SetValueKey","HKL
M\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify\winwpa32\Impersona
te"
"registry","25/9/2008 6:49:50.233","C:\WINDOWS\Temp\vv0QZXFd.com","SetValueKey","HKL
M\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify\winwpa32\Startup"
"registry","25/9/2008 6:49:50.233","C:\WINDOWS\Temp\vv0QZXFd.com","SetValueKey","HKL
M\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify\winwpa32\Shutdown"
"registry","25/9/2008 6:49:50.233","C:\WINDOWS\Temp\vv0QZXFd.com","SetValueKey","HKL
M\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\MSSMGR\MSLIST"
"file","25/9/2008 6:49:50.515","C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\IEXPLORE.EXE","Wr
ite","C:\msntstza.exe"
"process","25/9/2008 6:49:50.561","C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\IEXPLORE.EXE",
"created","C:\msntstza.exe"
"file","25/9/2008 6:49:50.515","C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\IEXPLORE.EXE","Wr
ite","C:\msntstza.exe"
"process","25/9/2008 6:49:50.608","C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\IEXPLORE.EXE",
"terminated","C:\msntstza.exe"
"file","25/9/2008 6:49:50.515","C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\IEXPLORE.EXE","Wr
ite","C:\msntstza.exe"
"file","25/9/2008 6:49:51.640","C:\WINDOWS\Temp\vv0QZXFd.com","Write","C:\WINDOWS\Te
mp\twe1.bat"
"process","25/9/2008 6:49:52.218","C:\WINDOWS\Temp\vv0QZXFd.com","created","C:\WINDO
WS\system32\cmd.exe"
"file","25/9/2008 6:49:52.202","System","Write","C:\WINDOWS\Temp\twe1.bat"
"file","25/9/2008 6:49:52.218","C:\WINDOWS\Temp\vv0QZXFd.com","Write","C:\WINDOWS\Te
mp\vv0QZXFd.bat"
"file","25/9/2008 6:49:52.218","System","Write","C:\WINDOWS\Temp\vv0QZXFd.bat"
"process","25/9/2008 6:49:52.233","C:\WINDOWS\Temp\vv0QZXFd.com","created","C:\WINDO
WS\system32\cmd.exe"
"file","25/9/2008 6:49:53.811","C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe","Delete","C:\WINDOWS\Te
mp\vv0QZXFd.com"
"file","25/9/2008 6:49:53.936","C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe","Write","C:\Program Fil
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es\Capture\logs\deleted_files\C\WINDOWS\Temp\vv0QZXFd.bat"
"file","25/9/2008 6:49:53.952","C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe","Delete","C:\WINDOWS\Te
mp\vv0QZXFd.bat"
"process","25/9/2008 6:49:53.999","C:\WINDOWS\Temp\vv0QZXFd.com","terminated","C:\WI
NDOWS\system32\cmd.exe"
"file","25/9/2008 6:49:53.983","C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe","Delete","C:\WINDOWS\Te
mp\twe1.tmp"
"process","25/9/2008 6:49:54.77","C:\WINDOWS\Temp\vv0QZXFd.com","terminated","C:\WIN
DOWS\system32\cmd.exe"
"file","25/9/2008 6:49:54.61","C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe","Write","C:\Program File
s\Capture\logs\deleted_files\C\WINDOWS\Temp\twe1.bat"
"file","25/9/2008 6:49:54.61","C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe","Delete","C:\WINDOWS\Tem
p\twe1.bat"
Appendix B
Manual Operation Scripts
The following are brief descriptions of the shell scripts we created for the
manual operation of Capture-HPC (as described in Chapter 3):
• check server csv.sh
Every 60 seconds prints out stats on the current CaptureServer progress.
The data includes number of URLs visited, number of malicious URLs,
safe URLs, and error counts. The data is in CSV format so the data
can easily be piped to a file and opened in a spreadsheet application.
• clear pdnsd cache.sh
Clears the PDNSD cache. Must be run as root. The old cache is copied
to archived caches in the proxy users home directory.
• clear squid cache.sh
Clears the Squid cache. This will stop and restart the Squid service.
The old cache is copied to archived caches in the proxy users home
directory.
• combine logs.sh <directory-containing-partial-logs>
This script is used to combine the log files from a number of partial
logs into a combined log for each type of log (ie. error.log, malicious.log,
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progress.log, and safe.log). The directory passed as a parameter should
contain only these partial log directories.
The script will remove all the empty log files that CaptureServer creates
for safe URLs (which could be hundreds of thousands) so can take some
time to complete.
• push vm.sh <vm-image-directory>
Pushes the VM image directory (passed as a parameter) to all the
clients specified in the script and installs these into VMWare Server,
which involves registering the VM, powering it on and creating a snap-
shot. The script uses key-based scp so the user needs to add their
identity to the authentication agent be issuing the ssh-add command
prior to running this script.
• start and keep resuming server.sh <input-urls-filepath>
This starts CaptureServer using the start server.sh script below,
passing it the URL file parameter. Then every 15min it checks that
the server is still progressing. If its not (indicating CaptureServer has
probably crashed), it will call the stop server move log.sh script, which
will kill the CaptureServer process and moves the logs into the Capture-
Server directory, with the number of remaining URLs to visit appended
to their name). If there no are more URLs left to inspect, the server
will be restarted. NOTE: When the server restarts, the <input-urls-
filepath> is truncated to only those URLs remaining to be visited.
Therefore the script makes a copy of the input-urls file with “.original”
appended.
• start server.sh <input-urls-filepath>
Starts CaptureServer.jar (with the specified URL file) and passes it
some standard parameters, these include the memory usage (-Xms512m
-Xmx1024m) IPStack (-Djava.net.preferIPv4Stack=true), and server
IP address/port (-s 10.0.0.1:7070).
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• start squid.sh
Starts the Squid proxy cache as a background process.
• stop server move log.sh <input-urls-filepath>
Generally only used as part of the start and keep resuming server.sh
script. Kills the CaptureServer process and moves the logs into the
CaptureServer directory, with the number of remaining URLs to visit
appended to their name. It then truncates the input URL file to only
the remaining URLs or indicates if there are no more URLs to inspect.
Appendix C
Service Interfaces and Data
Types
This appendix specifies the WSRF interfaces for our two Grid services,
and subsequently the complex data types used.
The ClientHoneypotManager interface is defined:
– CHSessionManagerReference initiateSession ();
– void registerClientHoneypot (ClientHoneypotDescriptor info);
– void deregisterClientHoneypot (ClientHoneypotDescriptor info);
– String processURLs (int priority, ClientHoneypotConfig settings,
Base64Binary urlListFile, Reference endpointRef);
– void terminateProcessing ();
– SessionStatus getStatus ();
The ClientHoneypotWrapper interface is defined:
– ResourceReference createResultsResource ();
– ResourceReference runClientHoneypotSh (ResourceReference resRef,
String[] arguments, String[] filenames, Base64Binary[] inputFiles);
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– String[] getFileList();
– Base64Binary getSingleFileSOAP(String filename);
– Status getStatus();
– boolean killProcess();
– boolean sendFileSOAP(String filename, Base64Binary inputFile);
– String[] getAllFilesGridFTP();
– boolean getSingleFileGridFTP(String filename);
– String getDir();
– State getStateRP();
We now present the complex types used in the previous WSRF services
in a readable form, they are formally defined in a XSD file. There are a
number of enumerated types included, the values will be defined in any
implementation and relate to a specific namespace. Within a complex
type definition we use ‘[ ]’ to define an optional type and ‘*’ to show that
more than one of the indicated types may be included. The complex
types are:
– ClientHoneypotDescriptor: int clientHoneypotType, String
clientHoneypotName, String location, int country, [int numberN-
odes], *[DataPair additionallData]
1. clientHoneypotType is the classification of the client honeypot
system, eg. HIGH INTERACTION.
2. clientHoneypotName is the system’s name, eg. “Capture-HPC”.
3. location is the URI of the system.
4. domain is the domain where the system is located, eg. “.nz”.
5. numberNodes is relevant if the system comprises of multiple
nodes.
6. additionallData is any other searchable information to be stored.
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– SystemDescriptor: int OS, [int OSVersion], *(int browser), *[int
browserPlugin], *[int clientApp]
1. OS is the Operating System on the client system, eg. WINDOWS XP.
2. OSVersion is the specifc version of the OS, eg. SP2.
3. browser is a Web browser installed on the client system, eg. FIREFOX 3 1.
4. browserPlugin is any plugin installed in the Web browser,
eg. FLASH 9.
5. clientApp is any other applications installed in the client sys-
tem, eg. ACROBAT 9.
– ClientHoneypotConfig: int clientHoneypotType, [SystemDe-
scriptor clientSystemType], [int visitTime], *[DataPair addition-
alConfig], *[int pageMetaDataToCollect]
1. clientHoneypotType is the classification of the client honeypot
system, eg. HIGH INTERACTION.
2. clientSystemType is a descriptor of the client OS and appli-
cations.
3. visitTime is an option for high-interaction client honeypots to
specify the length of time to capture state changes after the
Web page loads.
4. additionalConfig is any system-specifc configuration options,
suh as setting the Java heap size for CaptureServer.
5. pageMetaDataToCollect is the name of any meta data at-
tributes to collect for malicious pages, eg. NUMBER OF REDIRECTS.
– Session: String ClientHoneypotLocation, String resultsLocationURI,
String creationTime, String sessionStatusReference
1. ClientHoneypotLocation is the URI of the client honeypot sys-
tem.
2. resultsLocationURI is the location where the results files will
be posted.
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3. creationTime is the timestamp of the session.
4. sessionStatusReference is a reference to the status of the ses-
sion.
– SessionStatus: int state, datetime startTime, int totalURLs,
int visitedCount, int maliciousCount, int safeCount, [int network-
Errors], [int processErrors], [int timeoutErrors], int totalErrors,
*[DataPair additionalData]
1. state is an enumerated value indicating the current state of
the client honeypot, eg. PROCESSING.
2. startTime is the timestamp of the current scan.
3. totalURLs is the total number of URLs being examined in the
session.
4. visitedCount, maliciousCount, and safeCount are counts of
pages processed.
5. networkErrors, processErrors, and timeoutErrors are counts
of specific error conditions from the pages processed.
6. totalErrors is the total of all error conditions from the pages
processed.
7. additionalData is any additional status information.
– MaliciousList: int count, *[URLData maliciousURL]
1. count is the number of malicious URLs in the list
2. maliciousURL provides data on an individual malicious URL.
There should be a separate entry for every malicious URL
counted.
– URLData: String url, *[DataPair metaData]
1. url is the URL that data is to be provided on.
2. metaData is meta data about the URL, such as the geographic
location of the Web server.
– DataPair: String attribute, String value
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1. attribute is the name of an attribute which has been measured.
2. value is the corresponding data value measured.
Appendix D
Java & Web Services System
Source Code
The following is the sample code we wrote for the Java & Web services
system (described in Section 5.3.2):
import java.io.File;
import java.rmi.RemoteException;
import org.apache.axis.types.URI;
//Introduce generated client code
import nz.ac.mcs.vuw.dsrg.geii.clienthoneypotwrapper.client.
ClientHoneypotWrapperClient;
import nz.ac.mcs.vuw.dsrg.geii.clienthoneypotwrapper.context.client.
ClientHoneypotWrapperResultResourceClient;
import nz.ac.mcs.vuw.dsrg.geii.clienthoneypotwrapper.context.stubs.types.
ClientHoneypotWrapperResultResourceReference;
public class ClientHoneypotProcessor {
public static void main(String[] args) {
//Variables for testing
String url =
"http://10.73.2.133:8080/wsrf/services/cagrid/ClientHoneypotWrapper";
ClientHoneypotWrapperResultResourceReference resRef1 = null , resRef2 = null;
String pipedFile="safe.txt";
String[] args1={"-u", "test-urls.txt"};
String[] args2={"-u", pipedFile};
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String localResultsDir1="/Users/dave/Desktop/run-1";
String localResultsDir2="/Users/dave/Desktop/run-2";
String[] inputFilepaths1={"/Users/dave/Desktop/test-urls.txt"};
String[] inputFilepaths2={localResultsDir1 + "/" + pipedFile};
System.out.println("Starting processing 1");
resRef1 = startProcessing(url, resRef1, args1, inputFilepaths1);
getOutputFiles(localResultsDir1, resRef1);
System.out.println("Starting processing 2");
resRef2 = startProcessing(url, resRef2, args2, inputFilepaths2);
getOutputFiles(localResultsDir2, resRef2);
}
public static ClientHoneypotWrapperResultResourceReference startProcessing(
String url, ClientHoneypotWrapperResultResourceReference resRef, String[]
arguments, String[] inputFilepaths){
final ClientHoneypotWrapperClient client;
try {
client = new ClientHoneypotWrapperClient(url);
} catch (URI.MalformedURIException e) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("Malformed URL: " + url, e);
} catch (RemoteException e) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("Remote Exception", e);
}
//load files into Base64 arrays
String[] fileNames = new String[inputFilepaths.length];
byte[][] data = new byte[inputFilepaths.length][];
File inputFile;
for (int i=0; i<inputFilepaths.length; i++) {
inputFile = new File(inputFilepaths[i]);
fileNames[i] = inputFile.getName();
data[i] = ClientHoneypotWrapperClient.encode(inputFile);
}
try {
resRef = client.runClientHoneypotShBLOCK(resRef, arguments,
fileNames, data);
} catch (Exception e) {
System.out.println(e);
throw new RuntimeException("Error invoking command ", e);
}
System.out.println("resRef1:"+ resRef.toString());
return resRef;
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}
public static void getOutputFiles(String localDir,
ClientHoneypotWrapperResultResourceReference resReference){
ClientHoneypotWrapperResultResourceClient resClient;
try {
resClient = new ClientHoneypotWrapperResultResourceClient(
resReference.getEndpointReference());
} catch (RemoteException e) {
throw new RuntimeException(
"Initialization of Context Service client", e);
} catch (URI.MalformedURIException e) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("Malformed URL: ", e);
}
try{
String[] outFilenames = resClient.getFileList(resReference);
for (int i=0; i<outFilenames.length; i++) {
byte [] outputData = resClient.getSingleFileSOAP(resReference,
outFilenames[i]);
if (outputData !=null) {
ClientHoneypotWrapperClient.decode(outputData, localDir,
outFilenames[i]);
}
}
}catch (Exception e) {
System.out.println("Error getting file " + e);
throw new RuntimeException("Requesting file: ", e);
}
}
}
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